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INTRODUCTION
States of emergency are today one of the most serious challenges to
the implementation of international human rights law (IHRL). They have
become common practice and are associated with severe human rights vio-
lations as evidenced by the Arab Spring. The international jurisprudence
on states of emergency is inconsistent and divergent, and what now consti-
tutes a public emergency is ubiquitous. This trend is underpinned by exces-
sive judicial deference and abdication of the legal review of states' often
* LL.M. (Cambridge). Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of the LL.M. in
International Human Rights Law, School of Law and Human Rights Centre, University of
Essex. This Article benefited from the helpful suggestions of Professor Sir Nigel Rodley and
Dr. Noam Lubell. All mistakes are the author's alone.
491
Michigan Journal of International Law
dubious claims of a state of emergency. The legal regime, as positively
expressed in international human rights treaties, does not adequately re-
flect the underlying theory and politics of emergency situations. The ren-
aissance of IHRL as an effective constraint and regulator of states of
emergency requires the articulation of a more holistic understanding and a
new approach to the legal doctrine. This Article seeks to provide an en-
riched account of the international law on states of emergency, which can
be reconciled with both theory and practice, and which will better protect
human rights from regression in times of emergency.
The modern origins of the state of emergency as a legal concept came
from nineteenth-century Western Europe and from the liberal democratic
tradition. States of emergency are built on the somewhat artificial dichot-
omy of norm and exception, which endorses a bifurcated approach to bal-
ancing the interests of societal goals and individual rights. "State of
emergency" is therefore a label that may provide instant legitimacy to the
greater limitation of human rights by government.
Serious violations of human rights often accompany emergency situa-
tions, which are variously known as "states of emergency," "states of ex-
ception," "states of siege," and "martial law."' The central international
human rights treaties envisage a regime of derogation allowing states par-
ties to temporarily adjust their obligations under the treaties in excep-
tional circumstances. The two legal questions that constitute the heart of
the derogation regimes are first, whether a situation constitutes a "public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation," and second, whether
the measures are "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." 2 A
third question or requirement is that the state derogating must notify the
treaty depositary and therefore in practice the other state parties of its
public emergency and measures of derogation.3
While states do not deny that human rights should continue to apply
during an emergency,4 in practice they have co-opted and distorted the
derogation regime under IHRL. One in-depth U.N. study concluded that
about ninety-five states, or around half of the countries in the world, had
been under a state of emergency, actual or declared, during the period of
1. Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency, The Administration of Justice and the
Human Rights of Detainees: Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency: Tenth An-
nual Rep., 11 20, 33, 48, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19 (June
23, 1997) (by Leandro Despouy) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report].
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Human Rights
Committee [H.R. Comm.], General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency, 1 2, 4, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment No. 29]
("Before a State moves to invoke article 4, two fundamental conditions must be met: the
situation must amount to a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, and the
State party must have officially proclaimed a state of emergency.").
3. E.g., General Comment No. 29, supra note 2, 1 17; see also ICCPR, supra note 2,
art. 4.
4. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 8.
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1985-1997.5 The so-called Arab Spring-the popular uprisings in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and elsewhere-are evidence of the
need to reconsider this legal issue. It is no coincidence that many countries
within the Arab Spring had in place abusive states of emergency that had
lasted decades.6 Furthermore, many of the recent situations of "emer-
gency" in these Arab states were arguably brought about by the respective
governments' violent responses to initially peaceful protests by their own
people.
The jurisprudence on states of emergency and derogations under
IHRL is inconsistent and divergent. The most prominent jurisprudence on
this subject derives from the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights (the Covenant) and the European Convention on Human Rights,
both of which evidence a clear gap between the principles espoused and
actual international decisions and determinations. This is unsurprising. It
was a recognized view in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in the
1950s, during the process of drafting the two international covenants, that
the article on derogations "might produce complicated problems of inter-
pretation and give rise to considerable abuse."7
A central issue in the jurisprudence is determining the existence of a
situation of emergency-a public emergency that threatens the life of the
nation-that justifies derogation of international human rights obligations.
The human rights treaty bodies have often abdicated responsibility for
making this determination (for example, the European Court of Human
Rights through the "margin of appreciation"8 ) and seldom overturn the
assertion of a state of emergency by a government.9 The treaty bodies pre-
fer to focus instead on the issue of proportionality of the emergency mea-
sures or rely on other elements of the legal test. The European Court of
Human Rights, for example, has acquiesced to a government assertion
that the threat of terrorism prior to any actual attack was a public emer-
gency threatening the life of the nation.10 With such a potentially low
threshold, it has become commonplace for regimes that do not respect
5. See Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency, The Administration ofJustice and
the Human Rights of Detainees: Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency: Final
Rep., add., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19/Add.1 (June 9, 1996) [hereinafter Special Rap-
porteur's Final Report].
6. The situation in Egypt and Syria is an example of this. See infra Part II.B.
7. Cf U.N. Secretary-General, Annotations on the Text of the Draft International
Covenants on Human Rights, ch. V, 36, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (July 1, 1955).
8. The "margin of appreciation" doctrine associated with the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) is based on the notion that each society is entitled to certain
latitude in balancing individual rights and national interests, as well as in resolving conflicts
that emerge as a result of diverse moral convictions. Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Apprecia-
tion, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 INT'L L. & POL. 843, 844-45 (1999).
9. The treaty bodies usually decide the cases on another basis. See infra Part III.A
(concerning jurisprudential interpretation of the ICCPR and ECHR).
10. A & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, 175-181 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91403; see also infra text
accompanying notes 246-258.
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human rights to claim a state of emergency in many situations that are ill
fitted to the language and intent of the international human rights treaties.
The elasticity of what now jurisprudentially constitutes a "state of emer-
gency" has provided a veneer of legality to specious claims by govern-
ments and has undermined the normativity of the law.
In attempting to address these difficulties in recent decades, there has
been no shortage of prescriptive solutions provided by scholarly projects
in IHRL.11 These however have tended to be highly formalist-calling es-
sentially for more and stricter rules-and based on unrealistic reform pro-
posals of the human rights implementation machinery. More recently, the
terrorist attacks of September 11 and the subsequent "war on terror"
brought a renewed interest in emergencies in political theory and constitu-
tional law scholarship.12 That scholarship has debated many of the key
underlying themes of states of emergency but has failed to grapple mean-
ingfully with the regimes of derogation contained in the human rights trea-
ties and the particular perspective of international law.
This Article demonstrates that the problems concerning states of
emergency under IHRL require a more nuanced understanding of and so-
lution to the problem. The relevant treaties provide a conception of law
that does not fully account for underlying issues of theory and politics.
This conception is based heavily on a rule-of-law model, as opposed to a
sovereignty model, and on the legal dichotomy of normality and exception
although without the necessary implementation superstructure to support
11. See, e.g., General Comment No. 29, supra note 2; The Siracusa Principles on the
Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in Permanent Rep. of the Neth. to the U.N., Note verbale dated Aug. 24, 1984 from
the Permanent Rep. of the Neth. to the U.N. Office at Geneva addressed to the Secretary-
General, annex, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter Siracusa Princi-
ples]; Workshop on the Norms and Procedures in Times of Public Emergency or Internal
Violence, Oslo, Nor., June 15-17, 1987, Oslo Statement on Norms and Procedures in Times of
Public Emergency or Internal Violence, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/31, reprinted in TURKO
INST. FOR HUMAN RIGrrs, DECLARATION OF MINIMUM HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS (1991);
INT'L LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE 12-13, 232-36 (1990), re-
printed in 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 716 (1991); INT'L LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SIxTY-FIRST
CONFERENCE 56-97 (1984) [hereinafter PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS], reprinted in 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1072 (1985). For a fuller discussion of these studies, see generally JOAN FITZPAT-
RICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS
DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY 66-81 (1994).
12. See, e.g., GIORGIo AGAMBEN, THE STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) (2003); DAVID DYZENi-AUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGAL-
ITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006); OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA Nr AoLAIN, LAW IN
TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006); David Cole, The
Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753 (2004);
John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency
Powers, 2 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 210 (2004); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1021-24 (2003); Tom R. Hick-
man, Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention and the Derogation
Model of Constitutionalism, 68 MOD. L. REV. 655 (2005); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a
Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1001 (2004); William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law After 9/11, 14 J.
POL. PHIL. 61 (2006).
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such important legal assumptions. The jurisprudence has also failed to
grapple with other key challenges of principle including the role of the
separation of powers, emergencies based on ongoing terrorist threats, de-
mocracy as a check on emergency powers, and issues of government cau-
sation of emergencies. In this regard, the jurisprudential evasions and
work-arounds developed over time can be seen as unsurprising reactions
to deeper forces at work.
This Article seeks to provide an enriched account and reconceptual-
ization of the IHRL on states of emergency. Based on a holistic review of
the theory, legal doctrine, and politics, it proposes a new interpretive ap-
proach to the key legal questions concerning states of emergency. The ob-
jective is a more coherent and intellectually honest account of the relevant
international human rights treaties, and one that will restore greater
normativity to the law. This Article argues that the most effective solution
is to reconceive the traditional substantive question of the existence of a
public emergency. This is done by understanding it as subsumed firstly into
the procedural question of notification and secondly into the substantive
question of proportionality of measures. This therefore does not mean the
traditional legal assessment and threshold of a public emergency is irrele-
vant. The assessment and threshold will form an inherent and integral part
of the proportionality assessment of the measures of derogation as com-
pared to the nature of the public emergency. This reinterpretation will ob-
viate the false assumption that the existence of a public emergency-that
is, the distinction between exception and normality-is an objective and
stand-alone legal question under IHRL. The redistribution of the formal
competence to determine a public emergency (that is, from the courts or
tribunals to the government) reinstates a concept of separation of powers
to states of emergency and IHRL. Making the existence of public emer-
gencies formally a political question, not a legal one, is a necessary conces-
sion to the highly sensitive nature of such emergencies that better reflects
constitutional and political theory and also general legal principles. The
proposed approach does not require significant changes in the IHRL im-
plementation machinery, nor even changes in the essence of determina-
tions of international courts or treaty bodies. Rather, it requires an
implicit acceptance of broader theoretical and political influences, but in a
way that enhances the normativity of IHRL. Most importantly, this rein-
terpretation makes clear that it is not necessary for courts and tribunals to
determine a public emergency and therefore constantly affirm, both di-
rectly and indirectly, the specious assertions of states.
This Article sets out a thesis for a new interpretation of states of emer-
gency under IHRL in four main parts. First, it briefly reviews the back-
ground of the theory and law on states of emergency, highlighting the key
themes from the historical and conceptual basis of international human
rights treaties. Second, the Article describes the practice and problems
concerning states of emergency, using examples from the Arab Spring
countries, and considers the limits of the IHRL implementation machin-
ery. Third, it reviews the problems with the current conception of the two
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central legal questions for states of emergency by analyzing European and
U.N. jurisprudence and the key challenges mentioned in this introduction.
Finally, it sets out and explains a new interpretative approach that harmo-
nizes the theory, legal doctrine, and current practice in the unsettled but
important area of protecting human rights in emergency situations.
I. BACKGROUND: THEORY AND LAW
A. Historical Origins and Use
It is necessary to begin with a brief sketch of the historical origins and
use of states of emergency. The legal regime of states of emergency is a
relatively modern development with origins in the French Revolution and
that gained a place in most national legal systems by the mid-twentieth
century.' 3 In a general sense, it involves "governmental action taken dur-
ing an extraordinary national crisis that usually entails broad restrictions
on human rights in order to resolve the crisis."14
The concept has historical roots that stretch as far back as Roman
times in the practice of nominating a "dictator" in exceptional circum-
stances of external attack or internal rebellion.15 It was not until the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries that "European constitutions . . .
tentatively began to elaborate the idea of a constitutional state of emer-
gency," although they typically left the important details to separate
legislation.16
The modern concept of the state of emergency began with a 1789 de-
cree of the French Constituent Assembly. This distinguished a "state of
peace" from a "state of siege," where under the latter, "all the functions
entrusted to the civilian authority for maintaining order and internal polic-
ing pass to the military commander, who exercises them under his exclu-
sive responsibility."17  After the French Revolution of 1848, the
Constitution of the Second French Republic included a new article that
prescribed that the occasions, forms, and effects of the "state of siege"
were to be elaborated in law.18
13. World War I corresponded with a permanent state of exception in most of the
warring states. For a useful overview of the history of states of exception, see AoAMBEN,
supra note 12, at 11-22; see also Stephen Humphreys, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio
Agamben's State of Exception, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677, 677-78 (2006) (book review).
14. Claudio Grossman, A Framework for the Examination of States of Emergency
Under the American Convention on Human Rights, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 36
(1986).
15. JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
7 (1992); Nigel S. Rodley, Book Review, 42 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 732, 732-33 (1993) (review-
ing ORAA, supra).
16. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1006-07 (discussing the experiences of France and
Germany).
17. AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 5 (quoting THEODOR REINACH, DE L'PTAT DE SIEGE:
1TUDE HISTORIQUE ET JURIDIQUE 109 (1885)).
18. Id. at 12.
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Around the same time, the concept also became relevant in North
America, particularly in U.S. constitutional law and practice. During the
American Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas
corpus guaranteed by Article I of the Constitution where it was deemed
necessary; he also imposed censorship of the mail and authorized the ar-
rest and detention of those suspected of "disloyal and treasonable prac-
tices." 19 In a speech to Congress in 1861 at the start of the war, the
President justified his actions by declaring "[w]hether strictly legal or not"
the measures adopted were taken "under what appeared to be a popular
demand and a public necessity."20
The key formative experience for states of emergency prior to the
founding of the United Nations and the drafting of the International Bill
of Rights was that in Germany. The Weimar Constitution written after
World War I "tried harder than most constitutions to ensure that constitu-
tional failure in a time of emergency [would] not occur." 21 Article 48 of
that constitution provided the President extraordinary powers to cope
with exceptional threats to the system, with "measures necessary to re-
establish law and order, if necessary using armed force and including the
suspension of a particular and limited set of rights." 22 During the thirteen
years that the Weimar Constitution was in effect, Article 48 was invoked
no less than two hundred and fifty times. 23 Almost immediately after tak-
ing power in Germany, and in the midst of the Great Depression, Adolf
Hitler and the Nazi government "proclaimed the Decree for the Protec-
tion of the People and the State, which suspended the articles of the Wei-
mar Constitution concerning personal liberties." 24 This decree was not
repealed, and so, as Agamben notes, "from a juridical standpoint the en-
tire Third Reich can be an exception that lasted twelve years." 25
During the course of World War II, democratic regimes were also
transformed by the expansion of emergency executive powers. 26 A notori-
ous example is the U.S. government's domestic internment during World
War II of 110,000 people of Japanese descent, 70,000 of whom were U.S.
citizens. 27 The significant impact of emergency situations on U.S. demo-
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id. at 20 (emphasis added) (quoting Abraham Lincoln).
21. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1007.
22. Id.; see The Reich Constitution of August 11th 1919 (Weimar Constitution) with
Modifications, PSM DATA, http://www.zum.de/psm/weimar/weimar-vve.php (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013).
23. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1008.
24. AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 3; see Translation: Decree of the Reich President for
the Protection of the People and the State, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM'L MUSEUM, http://
www.ushmm.org/wlc/enlarticle.php?Moduleld=10007889 (last updated May 11, 2012).
25. AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 3.
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id. at 22.
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cratic governance was also felt during the Cold War. 2 8 President Truman
first declared a state of emergency in response to the conflict in Korea and
'communist imperialism' in 1950, a state of emergency that lasted nearly a
quarter of a century.29 The declaration of emergency was used over time
to justify a number of U.S. actions in the fight against communism.30
Scheppele notes that "[b]etween the 1930s and 1970s, Congress passed
about 470 statutes that empowered the executive branch to act under
emergency powers." 3 1 As this necessarily brief historical sketch demon-
strates, declarations of states of emergency have generally taken place in
the context of exceptional threats, including situations of war, and where
the nation was or was perceived to be fighting for survival.32
B. Conceptual Basis
The issue of states of emergency has been the subject of significant
scholarly work. Not only has it been studied from the IHRL perspective,33
but also more in-depth from the constitutional law perspective as demon-
strated by the respective U.S. studies during the Cold War by Clinton Ros-
siter and Carl Friedrich. 34 It also has a conceptual foundation in political
28. See Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1 4, 181; Scheppele, supra
note 12, at 1015.
29. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1017; Harry S. Truman, President of the United States,
Proclamation 2914-Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency (Dec. 16, 1950),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13684; see National Emergencies Act
1976, Pub. L. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2011)) (termi-
nating the National Emergency of Dec. 16, 1950 on Sept. 14, 1978).
30. For examples of rights abuses justified by emergency declarations to combat com-
munism, see Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1018-19.
31. Id. at 1019; see also SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TERMINATION OF THE NAT'L EMER-
GENCY, EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES: PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW Now IN EFFECT
DELEGATING TO THE EXECUTIVE EXTRAORDINARY AUTHORITY IN TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY, S. REP. No. 93-549, AT III (1ST SEss. 1973); JULES LOBEL, EMERGENCY POWER
and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1408 (1989).
32. See AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 15-19.
33. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 7, ch. V, 91 35-47; id. ch. VI, 53; FITZ-
PATRICK, supra note 11; ORAA, supra note 15; ANNA-LENA SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION: WIH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE TRAVAUX PRIPARATOIRES AND CASE-LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONITORING ORGANS (1998); L.C. Green, Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency Situa-
tions, 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 92 (1978); Oren Gross, "Once More unto the Breach": The Sys-
temic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched
Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 437 (1998); Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human
Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies: A Critique of Implementation by the European Com-
mission and Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations,
22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1981); Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties,
48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281 (1976); Susan Marks, Civil Liberties at the Margin: The UK Dero-
gation and the European Court of Human Rights, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 84-94
(1995); Dominic McGoldrick, The Interface Between Public Emergency Powers and Interna-
tional Law, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 380 (2004).
34. C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1957); CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP:
CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948).
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theory and philosophy, reaching as far back as Aristotle,35 and has more
recently been addressed in the twentieth-century writings of Carl Schmitt
in Germany.36
The conceptual rationale for states of emergency is relatively clear and
is rooted in the nature of the exceptional. As Rossiter suggests, in times of
crisis a government must "temporarily be altered to whatever degree is
necessary to overcome the peril and restore normal conditions."37 A ma-
jor research study of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) on
states of emergency that involved fifteen international experts and various
national studies has suggested that the "state of emergency is the counter-
part in international law of self-defence in penal law." 38 This idea of an
exceptional situation and a state's need to defend itself is underpinned by
an unusual balance between the collective's interests (for example, the life
of the nation) and the interests of the individual, in particular, in human
rights and civil liberties. The existence of mechanisms such as derogation
is often seen as a concession to the inevitability of exceptional state mea-
sures in times of emergency, and also as a means to control these mea-
sures.39 Derogations are based on the balancing of human rights with
collective goals such as public order and national security, terms that are
not easily defined by law.4 0
This balancing is not unique to derogation and emergencies, but
rather is a part of the general corpus of IHRL in which limitations are
often an inherent feature. As McGoldrick states, the "idea of limitations is
based on the recognition that most human rights are not absolute but
rather reflect a balance between individual and community interests." 41
35. See Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1004-05 (discussing Aristotle, Machiavelli, and
Bodin).
36. The main work on this issue was CARL ScMrrr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR
CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. Chi. Press
2005) (1922).
37. RossITER, supra note 34, at 5.
38. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS [ICJ], STATES OF EMERGENCY: THEIR IMPACr ON
HUMAN RIGirrs, at iii, 413 (1983) [hereafter ICJ STUDY]; see also MANFRED NOWAK, U.N.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 84 (2d rev. ed. 2005)
("[Ilt offers a State's democratically legitimate, supreme constitutional organs a basis for
avoiding exceptional, irreparable damages to the general public .... ).
39. Hickman, supra note 12, at 657; Humphreys, supra note 13, at 678.
40. Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through Law [Venice Comm'n], Opinion on the Pro-
tection of Human Rights in Emergency Situations, 1 36, 66th Plenary Sess., Opinion No. 359/
2005 (Apr. 4, 2006) ("A balance has to be found between national security, public safety and
public order, on the one hand, and the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms, on the
other hand."); SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 188-91; see also Hartman, supra note
33, at 2.
41. McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 383. This is reflected in the structure of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, which has a general limitations provision in Article 29. See
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948); see also Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities, The Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limi-
tations on Human Rights and Freedoms Under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of
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Derogation of human rights in times of emergency "raises, in an especially
acute way, issues of the scope" of IHRL and its "relationship with the
concept of state sovereignty." 4 2 There tends to be an overlap between the
limitations and derogations of IHRL, with many of the same principles
applicable (for example, proportionality, nondiscrimination). 43 However,
inherent in the state of exception concept is the need to restore normalcy
in which the full range of human rights can be respected.44 The derogation
concept is a product of a key distinction between normalcy, which is the
general state of affairs, and emergency (for example, the French "state of
siege"), which is the state of exception.45 That said, however, a clear dis-
tinction in practice between normalcy and exception is obviously recog-
nized as somewhat artificial.46 As Abi-Saab suggests, we should refute a
clear dichotomy between ordinary limitations and extraordinary deroga-
tions, as they "partake of the same nature and constitute a legal
continuum." 47
C. Two Schools: Sovereignty and Legality
Generally speaking, there are two broad schools of thought on legality
during a state of exception. At the theoretical level, there is a divide in
scholarship between those who favour a rule-of-law approach (constitu-
tional or legislative) for the state of exception, and others who "criticize
the pretense of regulating by law what by definition" they say cannot be
reduced to legal norms.48 The latter "understands the state of exception to
be 'essentially extrajuridical', something prior to or other than law." 49 The
supporters of this view-which can be called the sovereignty approach-
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1983) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes); Higgins,
supra note 33, at 283. Not all scholars agree with this view. See, e.g., Aileen McHarg, Recon-
ciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty
in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 62 MOD. L. REV. 671, 672
(1999) ("There is thus something of a paradox in a legal scheme which is supposed to protect
the individual against the collective, itself sanctioning limitations to rights on collective inter-
est grounds.").
42. McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 388. See generally A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION 847-81 (2001) (discussing the development of Article 15 of the ECHR and early invoca-
tions of the article).
43. McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 383-84.
44. See, e.g., General Comment No. 29, supra note 2, I1 1-2 ("The restoration of a
state of normalcy where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured must be the
predominant objective of a State party derogating from the Covenant.").
45. Oren Gross & Fionnuala Nf Aoldin, Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Applica-
tion of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 23 Hum. RTs. 0. 625, 644 (2001); Gross, supra note 33, at
439-40.
46. Georges Abi-Saab, Foreword to SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at v, vi.
47. Id. at vi.
48. AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 10.
49. Humphreys, supra note 13, at 678.
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believe that it is neither possible nor desirable to control executive action
in times of emergency using standard juridical accountability mecha-
nisms.50 Carl Schmitt, writing in the interwar period in Germany, and
probably the most well-known proponent of this approach, stated:
The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor
can one spell out what may take place in such a case, especially
when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and of how it is
to be eliminated. The precondition as well as the content of juris-
dictional competence in such a case must necessarily be unlimited.
From the liberal constitutional point of view, there would be no
jurisdictional competence at all. The most guidance the constitu-
tion can provide is to indicate who can act in such a case.51
Underlying Schmitt's thesis is the idea that rule of law constraints may
prevent a polity from defending itself in a serious crisis, and that the ca-
pacity of a ruler to maintain the existence of the liberal state may depend
on not being bound by the law. As Scheppele indicates, the "state of ex-
ception is, as a result, the means for restoring the order necessary for le-
gality to exist." 52 Schmitt's thesis has been somewhat supported by various
authors in the context of the post-September 11 legal debates on U.S. con-
stitutional law.53 Giorgio Agamben, a key recent writer in this area, does
not accept Schmitt's thesis but still concludes similarly that the state of
exception is "a fictio iuris par excellence, which claims to maintain the law
in its very suspension as force-of-law." 54 Central to this Article is the pre-
mise that the sovereignty perspective is informed by a pragmatic view of
the law's inability to regulate executive action in a national crisis. Such a
pragmatic view is evident in the examples mentioned above, such as when
President Lincoln justified the suspension of habeas corpus as necessary to
ending the war, "whether strictly legal or not."
For many scholars though, the Schmitt sovereignty thesis and its mod-
ern equivalents are unacceptable. The contrary view, dominant in IHRL,
is that even in a state of emergency the rule of law must still prevail,55 or
50. See Gross, supra note 12, at 1021-24; Hickman, supra note 12, at 658.
51. ScHMrrr, supra note 36, at 6-7.
52. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1011.
53. See sources cited supra note 12.
54. AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 59.
55. This is well reflected in the third paragraph of the preamble of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights: "Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law ..... Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 41, pmbl.; see also Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 47 ("[Tlhe very
fact that it is an extreme legal remedy means that it cannot lie outside the rules and principles
of law."). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, states
that the suspension of human rights does not imply "a temporary suspension of the rule of
law, nor does it authorize those in power to act in disregard for the principle of legality by
which they are bound at all times." Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and
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as some call it "the principle of legality." 56 From a theoretical perspective,
commentators such as Agamben hold the view that the state of exception
is "an integral part of positive law because the necessity that grounds it
acts as an autonomous source of law."57 As much as Schmitt's and others'
similar perspectives are rooted in realpolitik, so too are criticisms of their
approaches. The recognition that fictitious states of exception provide a
vehicle for abusive state action goes back as far as 1885.58 The risk, as
Claudio Grossman puts it, is that "[t]he increased concentration of govern-
mental power, along with the destruction of societal checks and balances,
creates and perpetuates entrenched authoritarian systems." 59 Therefore
the legal supervision of states of emergency becomes of primary impor-
tance since the gravest violations of human rights may occur where states
use their power unfettered by the rule of law. Furthermore, as Cole argues
in the context of the post-September 11 debate on U.S. constitutional law,
those who call for suspension of the rule of law in times of emergency have
failed to provide support for why this sovereignty approach is more ac-
ceptable or more likely to ensure the security of the population in the long
term.60
Apart from the sovereignty argument offered by Schmitt and others,
the rule-of-law approach faces another challenge that is grounded in con-
stitutional and political theory rather than international law: separation of
powers. Under this concept, the rule-of-law approach presents a challenge
to the balance of powers between the branches and may endanger the
domestic legitimacy of the courts. The IHRL scholarship on states of
emergency and derogations has referred very little to the separation of
powers.61 Yet as one commentator notes, the balancing of human rights
and the public interest is "the area in which the political or value-laden
nature of the choices facing [a] court is most obvious, raising questions as
to the legitimacy of judicial rather than democratic decision-making." 62
For some, particularly the general public, the comprehensive rule-of-law
approach may raise the objection that judges are inappropriately substitut-
ing their own views on a state of emergency for those of the democratically
elected public representatives. While this argument is a challenge gener-
ally for the law, it is naturally more acute in crisis situations where the life
of the nation may be at stake.
7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, 1 24 (Jan. 30, 1987).
56. See id.; Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 50.
57. AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 23.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Grossman, supra note 14, at 36; see also ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 417-24.
60. Cole, supra note 12, at 1757.
61. Humphreys notes this about Agamben's otherwise instructive book. Humphreys,
supra note 13, at 684.
62. One aspect is described as "the legitimacy of allowing unelected judges to decide
whether particular policies are justified in the public interest and whether it is necessary for
these to defer to individuals rights or vice versa." McHarg, supra note 41, at 672, 695.
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D. Democratic and Nondemocratic States
A somewhat overlooked but underlying issue in this debate is the
democratic or nondemocratic nature of the state. Agamben notes that "it
is important not to forget that the modern state of exception is a creation
of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one."63 It
is not surprising therefore that many perspectives on states of emergency
are based on an assumption of a democratic state. Rossiter, for example,
indicates that "the problem of elaborating systems of crisis government
arises only within states that have previously achieved some level of de-
mocracy and retain at least a symbolic, if not real, attachment to its preser-
vation."6 Underlying this is a suggestion that the democratic nature of
government provides a better foundation for strong executive powers in
an emergency and, therefore, for the limitation of human rights. Scheppele
argues that "[f]or an executive to seize power and suspend rights under a
democratic constitutional government is an entirely different matter, nor-
matively speaking, than for a monarch (even a constitutional monarch) to
do so."65 This view plays into the rationale and legitimacy of government
as the people's democratically elected representative to act potentially be-
yond the strict confines of the rule of law, and it also resonates with the
theory of separation of powers. It implicitly suggests that a pluralistic de-
mocracy will better safeguard the rights of its citizens in time of emer-
gency, with rights such as freedom of religion, association and assembly,
freedom of expression, and a free press.
This issue of democratic and nondemocratic states is seldom referred
to as a factor in IHRL scholarship. This is perhaps not surprising as it is
not part of the law as positively expressed in the IHRL treaties. However,
Anna-Lena Svensson-McCarthy raises it in the historical context of World
War II in her major study on states of emergency and human rights:
There was, on the other hand, a fundamental difference in the
way that autocratic methods of government were used by the de-
mocracies and the dictatorships [in World War II]: they were used
for entirely different purposes. The former made temporary use of
exceptional powers to enable them to defend themselves effi-
ciently and to return fully after the war to their democratic consti-
tutional order, wherein their peoples could again enjoy their rights
and freedoms. The latter countries did so for offensive motives,
namely, in order to maintain and expand permanently oppressive
and racist governments under which individuals would not have
been able to be truly free. 66
63. AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 5.
64. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 23. In Rossiter's view, altering government as nec-
essary to overcome the peril and restore normal conditions during crisis is predicated on "a
democratic, constitutional government." See RoSSITER, supra note 34, at 5.
65. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1005; see also NOWAK, supra note 38, at 84 (justifying
a state of emergency based on a democratically legitimate state).
66. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
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Svensson-McCarthy's general view of states of emergency, which is
further elaborated below, not surprisingly relies heavily on democracy.67
An implicit point is that democratic government and society can be a con-
straint on exceptional powers in times of emergency, a constraint that is
separate from the law and judiciary. This is an important point that will be
taken up further below, but whether or not the point is correct, it appears
predicated on a truly existential threat to the nation (for example, as faced
by many Western European democracies in World War II). In more recent
times, the idea of democratic governance and society as a constraint on
executive power seems to have permeated the European jurisprudence.
For example, the European Commission for Democracy Through Law, the
Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters (also known
as the Venice Commission), provided the following opinion on human
rights in emergency situations: "[t]he security of the State and its demo-
cratic institutions, and the safety of its officials and its population, are vital
public and private interests that deserve protection, if necessary at high
costs."68 This suggests a balancing of interests between the state and civil
and political rights in favor of the former "if necessary."
There are various problems with fully endorsing this "democracy as
constraint" perspective for IHRL and states of emergency. It is necessary
to acknowledge, as Svensson-McCarthy does, that "excesses and abuses"
did and do occur in democracies. 69 As examples above demonstrate, such
as U.S. internment of Japanese residents during World War II, democra-
cies are not immune to abuse of states of emergency. It is true that modern
practice shows the abuse of states of emergency is most serious in relation
to governments that are not truly democratic or responsive to the will of
their people. However, while the violations of true democracies may not
be of the same magnitude as the violations of nondemocracies, they are
human rights violations nonetheless and cannot be easily dismissed or ra-
tionalized. Measures put in place in an emergency may also subvert many
of the rights that are central to democracy, such as freedom of expression,
assembly, and association. Moreover, what is or is not a democracy and
whether this distinction may justify differential treatment are difficult
questions. The definition of a modern "democracy" is no longer an easy
one, and today's international landscape is characterized by great variation
of state regimes that possess an equally varied array of human rights chal-
lenges. Furthermore, as actors in the international system, no states are
immune from self-interested claims and assertions including for states of
emergency.
The point of this brief summary is to sketch, rather than elaborate and
resolve, some of the underlying themes relating to states of emergency.
67. Id. at 4-6. Svensson-McCarthy makes it one of three pillars of her arguments in
her book. See id. at 4-5. See generally id. ch. 4.
68. Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 5 (emphasis added). Article 15 on derogations in
the ECHR also refers to "measures necessary in a democratic society," which is not found in
Article 4 of the ICCPR. Id. 7.
69. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 2.
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These general themes are important for placing the international human
rights treaty law and practice in its proper context, and for the thesis that
is articulated in this Article.
The modem origins of the state of emergency as a legal concept came
from nineteenth-century Western Europe and from the liberal democratic
tradition. States of emergency are built on the somewhat artificial dichot-
omy of norm and exception, which endorses a bifurcated approach to bal-
ancing the interests of the collective (for example, national security) and
the individual (that is, human rights). "State of emergency" is therefore a
label that may provide instant legitimacy to the greater limitation of
human rights by government. Yet the concept is not conducive to clear
definition; as one political theorist notes, it is an "ambiguous, uncertain,
borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political."70 Many
scholars have also predicated their analysis of emergency measures on a
democratic form of government. A distinction between democracies and
nondemocracies would be difficult to apply in practice, and, in any event,
democratic governments are not immune to abuses of states of emergency.
On the question of the two broad schools of thought-rule of law and
sovereignty-and their associated variations, it is not necessary to take a
view here on the better approach. This is not an easily resolved issue; as
one scholar writing recently on states of emergency has said, "the question
of the limits of the rule of law is the central question of jurisprudence." 71
There are various attempts to find an intellectual middle ground, but these
may not yet provide a convincing solution.72 Rather the point is that there
are different views, and these different views are important for under-
standing the nature of the doctrinal law on states of emergency, including
its contested interpretation and application in practice, as will be shown
below.
E. Treaty Regimes and Law
The general shape and development of the treaty regimes provides an
interesting comparison to the underlying themes identified above. The
first instrument of the International Bill of Rights, the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),73 did not even include a specific
regime for states of emergency. The UDHR reflected the balance of indi-
vidual rights and public interest in a general clause on the permissible limi-
tations on the exercise of rights.74 Article 29 recognized the individual's
"duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of
his personality is possible" and that in exercising rights and freedoms eve-
ryone shall be subject only to limitations for the purpose of securing re-
70. AGAMBEN, supra note 12, at 1 (quoting Alessandro Fontana, Du droit de resistance
au devoir d' insurrection, in LE DROIT DE RESISTANCE 16 (Jean-Claude Zancarini ed., 1999)).
71. DYZENHAUS, supra note 12, at 7.
72. See, e.g., AGAMBEN, supra note 12; Humphreys, supra note 13.
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 41.
74. Id. art. 29.
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spect for the rights of others and "of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society."7 5
In the negotiation of the two international human rights covenants, it
was the United Kingdom that proposed in 1947 a specific derogation re-
gime for states of emergency.76 The British proposal was promoted on the
basis that it was necessary to guard against states being forced to suspend
human rights in toto in time of war.77 The U.K. argument drew on British
wartime experiences, but there was also a view among commentators that
the argument was connected to the frequent use of emergency rule in the
British colonies during this period.78 The central debate concerning the
British proposal was whether a limitations clause, as was already con-
tained in the UDHR, was preferable to a derogations clause. The United
Kingdom and others argued that "time of war" and other "extraordinary
peril or crisis" situations would not fall within the scope of the limitations
provided for in the various articles of the Covenant, nor could they be
adequately covered by a general limitations clause.79 In the end, Article 4
of the Covenant as agreed to by the Commission was very close to the
British draft language. The Commission's final text received only minor
amendments in the Third (Human Rights) Committee of the General As-
sembly, and its final adoption occasioned no great problems.80 Article 4
provided:
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the na-
tion and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States
Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating
from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social
origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15,
16 and 18 may be made under this provision.
75. Id.
76. See Rep. of U.K. to the U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, Letter from Lord Dukeston,
the United Kingdom Representative on the Human Rights Commission, to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, annex 1, art. 4(1), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/4 (June 5, 1947).
For the drafting history, see FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 38-40; NOWAK, supra note 38, at
88.
77. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 202 n.12.
78. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 213; see, e.g., FIrzPATRICK, supra note 11,
at 16.
79. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 7, ch. 5, 37; see also FITZPATRICK, supra note
11, at 52-53 (discussing drafting history).
80. See Rep. of the Comm'n on Human Rights, 10th Sess., Feb. 23-Apr. 16, 1954,
annex I(B), art. 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/705 (Apr. 1954); Higgins, supra note 33, at 286.
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3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the
right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Par-
ties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from
which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actu-
ated. A further communication shall be made, through the same
intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such
derogation.8'
The essence of the derogations regime in Article 4 is a system allowing
states parties to adjust their obligations temporarily under the Covenant in
times of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. As demon-
strated by the text, the key elements of the new derogation regime in-
cluded: (i) a threshold of severity cause, (ii) the requirement of national
proclamation and international notification to the treaty depositary, (iii)
the consistency of the derogation with the state's other international obli-
gations; (iv) the proportionality of the measures to the situation, (v) non-
discrimination in applying the measures, and (vi) the protection of
nonderogable rights.82 Article 4 is therefore a mechanism that permits
states to temporarily limit and modify the rights and obligations set out in
the ICCPR, with the exception of the extent to which those rights are
nonderogable.
The Covenant's text thus aimed at striking a balance between the pro-
tection of individual rights and the protection of national needs in times of
emergency by placing reasonable limits on emergency powers.83 The 1955
report on the drafting of the two covenants by the U.N. Secretary-General
spelled out this rationale:
It was also important that States parties should not be left free to
decide for themselves when and how they would exercise emer-
gency powers because it was necessary to guard against States
abusing their obligations under the covenant. Reference was
made to the history of the past epoch during which emergency
powers had been invoked to suppress human rights and to set up
dictatorial regimes. 84
The Covenant's drafters believed that the obligation to report publicly
any recourse to emergency powers would be an effective deterrent to un-
81. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 4 (emphasis added).
82. FrrzPATRICK, supra note 11, at 55. The other international obligations may include
law of armed conflict, which begins to apply when the relevant thresholds are met, for exam-
ple, and noninternational armed conflict within the state. See Special Rapporteur's Tenth
Report, supra note 1, 38.
83. See Hartman, supra note 33, at 11.
84. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 7, ch. V, J 37.
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warranted derogation.85 While the derogation regime won out over a gen-
eral limitations clause, this obviously did not remove other rights-specific
limitations from the scope of the Covenant and the individual rights it
protected. A large number of individual articles on specific human rights,
such as the freedoms of religion and association and the rights to liberty of
movement and peaceful assembly, still included the language of general
limitations.86
The European Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights also included derogations articles based on
similar, though not identical, principles as Article 4 of the Covenant.87
While the European Convention was concluded in 1950, sixteen years ear-
lier than the Covenant, the negotiation of the Covenant's article on dero-
gation was well developed by that time, and the European article on
derogation was also the result of a British initiative.88 In contrast, the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of 1981 did not regulate states
of emergency, nor did it contain a derogations provision. The African
Charter relied on a general limitations clause similar in nature to that of
the UDHR.89 The Arab Charter on Human Rights of 2004 included a der-
ogation regime.90 Accordingly, states may be subject to different emer-
gency derogation regimes depending on the treaties and instruments to
which they are party, particularly as the list of nonderogable rights varies
from treaty to treaty. The Covenant's derogations article, for example,
provides for more nonderogable rights than the correlative article of the
European Convention.
As indicated above, there are difficult issues concerning the legal di-
chotomy between normality and exception, as well as what justifies the
derogation as opposed to limitation of human rights. The primary example
given of derogation in the Covenant negotiations was the instance of
"war." 91 Yet, unlike the European Convention, which refers to "war or
85. For example, see the view of Rene Cassin, representative of France in the Commit-
tee charged with drafting the Covenant. Comm'n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the
127th Meeting, 5th Sess., June 14, 1949, 7-8, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/SR.127 (June 17, 1949).
86. See ICCPR, supra note 2, arts. 18(3), 19(3), 22(2), 12(3), 21.
87. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 [hereinafter IACHR]; European Convention on Human Rights art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. For the drafting history of the IACHR, see FITZPATRICK,
supra note 11, at 42-43.
88. FITzPATRICK, supra note 11, at 40-41; Higgins, supra note 33, at 289.
89. Compare African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 27(2), June 27, 1981,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 ("The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised
with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest."),
with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 41, art. 29(2) ("In the exercise of his
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society.").
90. Arab Charter on Human Rights, League of Arab States, art. 4, May 22, 2004, re-
printed in 12 Irr'L Hum. RTs. REP. 893 (2005).
91. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 7, ch. V, 91 38-39.
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other public emergency," 92 or the American Convention, which refers to
"war, public danger, or other emergency," 93
the Covenant makes no reference to "war." The [Covenant's]
travaux prdparatoires indicate that the omission was intentional
and that it was motivated by an important symbolic concern.
"While it was recognized that one of the most important public
emergencies was the outbreak of war, it was felt that the covenant
should not envisage, even by implication, the possibility of war, as
the United Nations was established with the object of preventing
war." 94
It would seem unlikely though that this was the sole reason for all states
negotiating the Covenant. Certainly those seeking a broader interpreta-
tion of the right of derogation might have been aided by the exclusion of
war from the article. Yet, as Buergenthal pointed out, the omission clearly
did not exclude war, as it was the most dramatic public emergency that
may "threaten the life of the nation." 95 The scope of public emergency
also seemed to include "natural catastrophes as well as . . . internal distur-
bances and strife." 96 There was thus an overarching thread concerning the
magnitude of emergency that Bossuyt, in his work analysing the Cove-
nant's negotiation, described as follows:
The main concern was to provide for a qualification of the kind of
public emergency in which a State would be entitled to make der-
ogations from the rights contained in the covenant which would
not be open to abuse. The . . . wording is based on the view that
the public emergency should be of such a magnitude as to threaten
the life of the nation as a whole.97
This key trigger of Article 4-a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation-reflected the idea that a state of emergency only existed in
extremis, "when the state [faced] a challenge so severe that it [had to] vio-
late its own principles to save itself."98 The vagueness of this concept of
public emergency, however, was criticized in the U.N. Commission on
92. ECHR, supra note 87, art. 15.
93. IACHR, supra note 87, art. 27.
94. Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLIT-
ICAL RIGHTs 72, 79 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 7,
39); see also Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1 35.
95. Buergenthal, supra note 94, at 79.
96. Id.; Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, $ 35; NOWAK, supra note 38,
at 79 (referring to serious natural or environmental catastrophes, such as earthquakes, floods,
cyclones, or nuclear accidents).
97. MARC J. BossuYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVEAUX PRPARATOIRES" OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTs 85-86 (1987) (emphasis added).
98. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1004.
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Human Rights. 99 There was an awareness of the potential for abuse and
the negative experiences prior to drafting of the Covenant, particularly in
Germany. Those who supported the wording of draft Article 4 made com-
ments on its interpretation that were underpinned by fine, though perhaps
not clear or realistic, distinctions. As one state commented, while "it was
difficult to give a precise definition to the life of the nation," it "was signif-
icant that the text did not relate to the life of the government or of the
state."1oo
This brief review of the background and treaties provides some con-
text to understanding the orientation of the international human rights
treaties. The treaties incorporated the artificial dichotomy of norm and
exception by introducing a specific derogation regime based on the con-
cept of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. States of
emergency under IHRL are also firmly predicated on the rule-of-law ap-
proach (that is, legal and judicial control) for state powers during a time of
emergency. There appeared to be no concession in the treaties to the theo-
ries of Schmitt and others on the extralegal nature of emergencies and
therefore little recognition of the "point of imbalance between public law
and political fact"' 0 ' for states of emergency. The Covenant, European
Convention, and Inter-American Convention also do not differentiate le-
gally between democracies and nondemocracies. In sum, the treaty law is
more reflective of one side of the various debates identified above (for
example, the dichotomy of norm and exception, the rule of law rather than
extralegal measures, the nonrole of democracy); as will be shown below,
this has impacted the application, interpretation, and effectiveness of
IHRL.
II. PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS
A. Overview of Practice and Problems
State practice in invoking public emergencies and derogating from
human rights obligations has been widespread. A large number of states
have been in regular and constant states of emergency.102 The reasons
most often claimed by states for invoking a state of emergency have been
civil war and cases of serious internal unrest.103 As indicated above, over
the period of 1985-1997 about half of the states in the world were re-
99. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 215.
100. Id. at 211 (quoting the representative from Chile).
101. See infra note 322.
102. In a 1983 study of the ICJ, it was estimated that thirty states were in some form of
emergency. ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 413. By 1986, the number of states estimated to be
in an emergency had increased to about seventy. See FITzPATRICK, supra note 11, at 3-4; see
also Daniel O'Donnell, States of Exception, INT'L COMMIsSIoN JURISTs REv., Dec. 1978, at
52, 53. Over the twelve-year period of 1985 to 1997, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for States
of Emergency reported that about ninety-five states were subject to a de jure or de facto state
of emergency. Special Rapporteur's Final Report, supra note 5, 1 6.
103. NOWAK, supra note 38, at 90.
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ported as subject to a de jure or de facto state of emergency.10 4 Even more
troubling was that many countries in this period had extended or reintro-
duced their states of emergencies. 05 At the time of the Special Rap-
porteur's final report in 1997, for example, his annual list suggested that
thirty states were in a situation "in which exceptional measures had been
in force for some time." 106
In addition to this practice, the constitutional and legal provision for
states of emergency has become almost universal, with one study indicat-
ing that over 145 states had constitutional provisions of this nature by
1996.107 Yet, there has been a problem concerning the consistency of many
such provisions with IHRL.108 As the U.N. Human Rights Committee has
observed, "[o]n a number of occasions the Committee has expressed its
concern over States parties that appear to have derogated from rights pro-
tected by the Covenant, or whose domestic law appears to allow such der-
ogation in situations not covered by article 4."109
There unfortunately has been a correlation between emergency situa-
tions and grave violations of human rights. Even those human rights from
which derogation is not permitted are often affected.110 This bleak record
has included states of emergency frequently accompanied by arbitrary de-
tentions without due process, disappearances, summary executions, tor-
ture, and other forms of ill treatment."' Freedom from arbitrary
104. Special Rapporteur's Final Report, supra note 5. For the typology of the Interna-
tional Law Association, see FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 3-21 (detailing the types and
examples of emergency).
105. See Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, IT 128, 180. See generally
Special Rapporteur's Final Report, supra note 5 (listing the countries that have been in, ex-
tended, or reintroduced a state of emergency).
106. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 128; see also Special Rap-
porteur's Final Report, supra note 5, at 2-16. The Final Report contains the tenth annual list
of the Special Rapporteur, which comprised countries and territories that he considered,
based on various sources of information, to be: (i) countries and territories in which an emer-
gency is in force and (ii) countries and territories in which emergency regimes in various
forms have been in force during the period from January 1985 to May 1997.
107. Linda Camp Keith & Steven C. Poe, Are Constitutional State of Emergency Clauses
Effective? An Empirical Exploration, 26 Hum. RTs. Q. 1071, 1080 tbl.1 (2004); see also No-
WAK, supra note 38, at 84.
108. The U.N. Human Rights Committee, for example, has not been restrained in tell-
ing states their constitutions are not consistent with Article 4. See FITZPATRICK, supra note
11, at 85-86; McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 386-87; see also Special Rapporteur's Tenth Re-
port, supra note 1, 184.
109. General Comment No. 29, supra note 2, 1 3.
110. A high incidence of grave human rights abuses, particularly of nonderogable
rights, will accompany an emergency. Amnesty Int'l, Torture and Violations of the Right to
Life Under States of Emergency, Al Index POL 30/02/88 (July 1988) (prepared for submission
to the U.N. Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency, Leandro Despouy); FrrZPATRICK,
supra note 11, at 35; Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 169.
111. Grossman, supra note 14, at 36. U.N. Special Rapporteur Despouy writes that the
rights engaged include the right to liberty and security of the person, right to liberty of move-
ment and freedom of residence, right to freedom from interference for home and correspon-
dence, right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to strike. See Special
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detention and fair trial are human rights particularly affected by emergen-
cies.112 The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, for example,
has described states of emergency as a "root cause" of arbitrary deten-
tion.113 States of emergency can impact economic, social, and cultural
rights as well as civil and political rights.1 14 Vulnerable groups may be the
most affected by human rights violations, especially minorities and refu-
gees, as well as journalists and human rights workers." 5 There is a dis-
turbing tendency, observed in the ICJ's study, for states of emergency to
become perpetual or to effect far-reaching authoritarian changes in the
ordinary legal system.116 Such semipermanent states of emergency lead to
risks of institutionalizing the limitations on human rights. This is evidenced
by the shift of offending laws from emergency legislation to permanent
internal security laws.11 7 This idea of "institutionalizing the emergency" is
well summed up by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency,
Mr. Leandro Despouy:
[T]he normal legal order subsists although, parallel to it, a special,
para-constitutional legal order begins to take shape . . . allowing
the authorities to invoke, according to the needs of the moment,
either the normal legal system or the special system, although in
Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 158; see also FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at
36-37; NOWAK, supra note 38, at 95.
112. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 38 n.44.
113. Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Promo-
tion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right to Development, 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4 (Jan. 10, 2008) (by
Leila Zerrougui).
114. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1 172. The 1983 ICJ study fo-
cused on fifteen states and analysed in-depth the human rights issues and violations. The ICJ
study revealed the very broad impact on a society of states of emergency that it described as
affecting not only freedom from arbitrary detention and the right to a fair trial, but also
trade union rights, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of associa-
tion, the right of access to information and ideas, the right to an education, the
right to participate in public affairs .. . not only individual rights but also collective
rights and rights of peoples, such as the right to development and the right to self-
determination.
ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 417; see also Grossman, supra note 14, at 36.
115. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 91 173, 175.
116. See ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 415; Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra
note 1, 1 127. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, refers to Brunei, Egypt, Turkey, Paraguay, the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (at 4-5), the United Kingdom (at 6-7), Chile (at 10), and
Malaysia (at 17); NOWAK, supra note 38, at 91, refers to Paraguay, Haiti, Brazil, Uruguay,
Colombia, Cameroon, Zaire, Syria, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Chile, Egypt, Peru, El
Salvador, Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, and Israel.
117. See, e.g., FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 17-18 (discussing Malaysia); Sri Lankan
Introduces New 'Anti-Terror' Legislation, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2001), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-south-asia-14735405 (discussing Sri Lanka); supra text accompanying notes
131-137 (discussing Syria).
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practice the former is clearly relinquished in favour of the
latter.118
Israel, for example, has a large volume of legislation that has been
developed as a consequence of its state of emergency and has become an
inherent part of its ordinary legal system.119 Israel even stated to the U.N.
Human Rights Committee that certain of its fundamental laws, orders, and
regulations depend on the existence of a state of emergency and would
need to be revised before lifting the emergency so as not to leave crucial
matters unregulated. 120
States of emergency can become a tool to protect a government or
leader by limiting freedom of expression, political assembly, and associa-
tion and other civil and political rights. "[T]he most serious human rights
violations tend to occur in situations of tension when those in power are,
or think they are, threatened by forces which challenge their authority" or
which they perceive to be a threat. 121 There is a tendency for some gov-
ernments to regard a challenge to their authority, even if peaceful, as a
threat to the life of the nation, and this is particularly so for governments
that provide no lawful means for transfer of power.122 As further dis-
cussed below, such governments can be quick to use disproportionate
force against peaceful protestors, particularly in nondemocracies, and then
utilise the resulting violence as a pretext to justify a state of emergency.
Terrorism has also posed a special problem for the law on states of
emergency. States, including democratic ones, have used terrorist threats
to justify a number of emergencies lasting decades. 123 States of emer-
118. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1$ 131, 132.
119. MENACHEM HOFNUNG, DEMOCRACY, LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN ISRAEL
49-50 (1996).
120. Human Rights Comm., Second Periodic Report of the Government of Israel, 72,
U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001).
121. ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at i, 274-75. One reason for this is the underlying situa-
tion, as the ICJ study comments:
[Ilt is the acute social conflicts that arise and will inevitably continue to arise in
societies founded on deep-seated disparities that are at the root of various states of
exception....
The civil or military groups that rule in this type of society have a tendency to
use states of exception as a means of perpetuating situations that are inherently
volatile and explosive.
Id. at 274-75.
122. Id. The Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency in his report refers to "legal
instrument[s] used by many dictators to suppress the human rights of most of the population
and to crush any form of political opposition," Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra
note 1, $ 5. Fitzpatrick refers to excessive use of force against demonstrators, clandestine
murders by security or others, summary execution and torture, and secret trial. FITZPATRICK,
supra note 11, at 35.
123. See, e.g., ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 83; supra text accompanying notes 131-137
(discussing Syria); supra text accompanying notes 138-146 (discussing Egypt); supra text ac-
companying notes 223-230, 239-245 (discussing the United Kingdom and Ireland).
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gency, coupled with broad-reaching and vague antiterrorism laws, can pro-
vide extraordinary powers for governance above the law. Antiterrorism
legislation is also a key vehicle for shifting human rights limitations from
emergency to ordinary legal systems.124 Furthermore, as terrorism often is
perceived by a state's population as an external threat (for example, from
foreigners or minorities), the democratic majority may also support a gov-
ernment's crisis mentality for further-reaching but less human rights-com-
pliant measures against the perceived threat. 125
In a state of emergency, separation of powers is impacted as executive
control can become more dominant, often leading to human rights viola-
tions.126 The judiciary and its work can suffer in the conditions that sur-
round these emergencies. A state of emergency can also lead to mass
dismissal of judges, to special or military courts, and to the restriction or
suspension of judicial review. 127 As former U.N. Special Rapporteur
Despouy stated, emergencies and their impact on institutions can "replace
the concept of the separation and independence of powers with that of a
hierarchy of powers." 128
The problems in the practice of states of emergency are many and
varied and combine to create a powerful and severe impact on human
rights protection. These problems include the inconsistency of constitu-
tional provisions and IHRL on derogations; the broad range of human
rights that are negatively affected, including the rights of minorities; the
fact that governments use self-preservation as a pretext for violent repres-
sion of peaceful opposition; the institutionalizing of emergency provisions
in the normal legal system; terrorism as an ongoing emergency; and dis-
torted separation of powers, which leads to the undermining of judicial
review.
124. There are also examples where states of emergency have ended and the emergency
laws in question have simply shifted or blurred into antiterrorism legislation. For example,
the Terrorism Act 2000 rolled back some long-standing emergency powers in Northern Ire-
land but consolidated many of the measures as permanent features of British antiterrorism
law. See Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11 (U.K.).
125. As Gross and Nf Aoldin comment, violent crises, of which September 11 is a good
example, often precipitate a reaction that "legal niceties may be cast aside as luxuries to be
enjoyed only in times of peace and tranquility" and a consequent "tranquilizing effect on the
public's critical approach toward emergency regimes." See GRoss & N1 AOLAIN, supra note
12, at 7, 236. Gross and Nf Aoldin also note the surprise that gripped the United Kingdom
when the 7/7 bombers were identified as British born and therefore not "outsiders." Id. at
224. Israel has reported to the U.N. Human Rights Committee that police searches and other
invasions of privacy were accepted by the public itself. See H.R. Comm., Summary Record of
the 1675th Meeting, 63d Sess., July 15, 1998, 50, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1675 (July 21,
1998).
126. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 30-31.
127. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 149.
128. Id. 1 150.
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B. The Arab Spring-Syria and Egypt
It is easy to underestimate how problematic states of emergency have
been in countries with serious and continuing violations of human rights.
The states most central to the Arab Spring-Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria,
Bahrain, and Yemen-have all invoked states of emergency to justify re-
pressive actions.129 International human rights treaty-monitoring bodies
have repeatedly questioned Algeria, Egypt, and Syria, for example, about
the need to maintain their emergency laws. 130 As these states' respective
emergency laws have been inextricably entwined with repressive political
regimes, the repeal of the state of emergency has been a central demand of
the popular Arab citizen uprisings. In this regard, the integral role of states
of emergency in institutionalizing human rights violations is well illus-
trated by a closer examination of the cases of Syria and Egypt respectively.
Syria has been subject to forty-eight years of emergency governance
under the Ba'thist regime currently led by President Assad. A 1963 emer-
gency decree vested almost total power in the President and the state's
military-security apparatus.1 31 The Constitution of Syria adopted in 1973
states that "laws enacted prior to the declaration of the Constitution re-
main in force until they undergo amendments which conform to the Con-
stitution."132 The emergency laws accordingly remain valid while being
prima facie unconstitutional and therefore in a sense override the constitu-
tion. The U.N. Human Rights Committee criticized Syria in 1978 for fail-
ing to provide notification of its state of emergency,133 and subsequently
the Committee noted that the Syrian government's laws and actions had
put Syria under a "quasi-permanent state of emergency, thereby jeopard-
izing the guarantees of article 4 of the Covenant."134 The Committee also
noted that the public emergency was continued "without any convincing
explanations being given as to the relevance of these derogations to the
129. See, e.g., Noura Erakat, Emergency Laws, the Arab Spring, and the Struggle
Against "Human Rights," JADALIYYA (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/
2051/emergency-laws-the-arab-spring-and-the-struggle-ag. In Bahrain, for example, it has
been estimated that the government's emergency response to predominantly peaceful dem-
onstrators led to forty killed, 1600 arrested and detained and many of those held incommuni-
cado for weeks and even months, and more than 300 convicted and sentenced including some
instances of the death penalty. See Human Rights Watch, World Report (2011), Bahrain,
available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-bahrain.
130. See H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Egypt, 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY (Nov. 28, 2002) [hereinafter H.R. Comm., Egypt]
(questioning Egypt); H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Commit-
tee: Syrian Arab Republic, 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/SYR (Apr. 24, 2001) [hereinafter
H.R. Comm., Syria 2001] (questioning Syria).
131. H.R. Comm., Syria 2001, supra note 130, 6.
132. ALKARAMA, THE PERMANENT STATE OF EMERGENCY-A BREEDING GROUND
FOR TORTURE 1, 5 (2010) (report submitted to the Committee Against Torture in the context
of the review of the Initial Periodic Report of the Syrian Arab Republic).
133. Rep. of the H.R. Comm., 7th Sess., July 30-Aug. 17, 1979, 293, U.N. Doc. A/34/
40 (Sept. 27, 1979); GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1979).
134. H.R. Comm., Syria 2001, supra note 130, 6.
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conflict with Israel and the necessity for these derogations to meet the
exigencies of the situation claimed to have been created by the
conflict. "135
Syria well illustrates the institutionalization of emergency by the trans-
fer of emergency laws into mainstream security laws. The government
lifted the state of emergency laws in April 2011 but little seemed to change
in practice.' 36 This is partly due to general laws having been passed to
"entrench the state of emergency," such as "criminalizing expression of
opposition to 'the aims of the revolution'"; legally "establish[ing] the State
Security apparatus, granting it sweeping powers of arrest and detention, as
well as effective impunity for human rights abuses"; and providing officials
immunity from prosecution for offenses committed in carrying out their
duties.'37
Egypt demonstrates many of the same issues and problems as Syria.
Egypt has been under a state of emergency for most of its modern exis-
tence in both its colonial and independence periods. The U.N. Human
Rights Committee has criticized Egypt's state of emergency as "semi-per-
manent."1 38 The Egyptian Emergency Law of 1958 was invoked after the
assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. The law summarily abro-
gated provisions of the constitution, drastically curbed freedom of expres-
sion and association, and institutionalized a parallel justice system
comprising specially constituted emergency courts and the trial of civilians
by military courts.139 Decree 1/1981, as amended in 2004, was adopted
based on the Emergency Law of 1958 and referred a variety of ordinary
crimes to state security courts, including "crimes" concerning state secur-
ity, public incitement (including by newspapers), and public demonstra-
tions and gatherings.140 The Egyptian state of emergency has been used
inter alia to detain people administratively without charge or trial; try peo-
ple before emergency or military courts (the procedures of which do not
satisfy international standards of due process); prosecute journalists and
135. H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Syrian
Arab Republic, 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/84/SYR (Aug. 9, 2005).
136. See Syria Protests: Assad to Lift State of Emergency, BBC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13134322; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WE'VE NEVER SEEN SUCH HORROR: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY BY SYRIAN SECURITY
FORCES 1-11 (2011).
137. AMNESTY INT'L, END HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SYRIA 1, 3-4 (2011) (pre-
pared for submission to the U.N. Universal Periodic Review, Oct. 2011).
138. H.R. Comm., Egypt, supra note 130, 9 6. It has also been referred to as "endless"
and "permanent." Sadiq Reza, Endless Emergency: The Case of Egypt, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV
532, 534-35, 543 (2007); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: STATE OF
PERMANENT EMERGENCY INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREE AND FAIR VOTE 28 (2010).
139. Martial law was first declared by the British rule in 1914 and martial law or emer-
gency rule, as it was later called, was declared periodically until 1981. See ICJ, ICJ SuBmis.
SION TO THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW OF EGYPT 1 n.1, 2, 4 (2009).
140. See ICJ, supra note 139, at 1-4.
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other government critics under criminal defamation legislation; and
strictly control freedom of expression, association, and assembly. 141
Egypt also evidences an institutionalization of the state of emergency.
The state of emergency was subject to periodic review and renewal by the
Egyptian People's Assembly, but this in practice was little more than a pro
forma exercise.142 The Emergency Law was renewed every two years with
the result that Egypt was under a state of emergency for the past thirty
years.143 In 2007, amendments were made to the constitution that effec-
tively rendered certain aspects of the emergency laws immune from judi-
cial review. 144 Amnesty International described these amendments as the
"most serious undermining of human rights safeguards in Egypt since the
state of emergency was re-imposed in 1981."145 The amendments also pro-
vided the government with permanent emergency-style powers in national
security laws so that "when it then bows at last to international criticism
and lifts the state of emergency the impact will be no more than
cosmetic." 146
The Egyptian government has long asserted that its emergency laws
are required to combat terrorist threats. 147 While Egypt faced high levels
of terrorist attacks between the 1970s and the 2000s, 148 more recently this
level of terrorism has declined. The Egyptian authorities are still involved
in policies aimed at combating the resurgence of terrorism and dismantling
alleged terrorist cells. However, the relevant Egyptian law does not limit
acts of terrorism to political armed violence; it broadly concerns "any
threat or intimidation" used in order to "disturb . . . peace or jeopardiz[e]
the safety and security of society." 149 After the overthrow of President
Mubarak in 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces indicated
141. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Supra note 138, at 1.
142. See INT'L FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EGYPT: COUNTER-TERRORISM AGAINST THE
BACKGROUND OF AN ENDLESS STATE OF EMERGENCY 5 (2010); Reza, supra note 138, at
536-38.
143. INT'L FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGrrs, supra note 142, at 5.
144. See, e.g., NATHAN J. BROWN ET AL., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE,
EGYPT'S CONTROVERSIAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 2 (2007), available at http://
www.constitutionnet.org/files/Egypt%20Constitution.pdf.
145. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Egypt: Proposed Constitutional Amendments Great-
est Erosion of Human Rights in Twenty-Six Years (Mar. 18, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Egypt
Press Release], available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/008/2007/en/
c74b5428-d3a5-lldd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/mdel20082007en.pdf.
146. Reza, supra note 138, at 543; 2007 Egypt Press Release, supra note 145.
147. See Michael Slackman, Egyptian Emergency Law is Extended for Two Years, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html.
148. See CARYLE MURPHY, PASSION FOR ISLAM: SHAPING THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST:
THE EGYPTIAN EXPERIENCE 4, 57, 82-83 (2002).
149. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Rep. on Mission to Egypt, 1 11, U.N.
Doc. A[HRC/13/37/Add.2 (Oct. 14, 2009) (by Martin Scheinin) (discussing Article 86 of the
Law Amending Some Provisions of the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law
Establishing State Security Courts, the Law on Secrecy of Bank Accounts, and the Law on
Weapons and Ammunition adopted in 1992).
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that it would repeal the emergency laws.150 The Supreme Council initially
approved an additional emergency law, prompting fears over the intracta-
bility of a mechanism so entrenched in the Egyptian legal and political
systems. 151 In May 2012, when the emergency laws were up for biannual
renewal, the Supreme Council permitted them to expire. 152 This expiry,
however, has been accompanied by new draft legislation from the Interior
Ministry for "safeguarding the gains of the revolution."153 The draft legis-
lation includes emergency-type measures relating to "protect[ing] state
supplies," "criminaliz[ing] hindering of work flow and attacking public and
private buildings," "protect[ing] places of worship," and "regulat[ing] pro-
tests in public streets," as well as a "proposal for a legal authority to help
the president pass laws."154 As the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Stud-
ies points out, the proposed laws "seek to codify repression by law and
enshrine exceptional measures . . . into the ordinary legal code" and sug-
gest that the government may be trying "to find a permanent alternative to
the infamous emergency law."155
C. Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement
As recognized above, the legal supervision of states of emergency is of
primary importance, as grave human rights violations often occur in this
context and states may use the power of derogation as a pretext or to a
larger extent than is justified.156 In this regard, the Covenant's drafters
150. Egypt Army in Emergency Law Pledge, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 10, 2011), http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121161511674298.html.
151. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHrs, REPORT OF THE
OHCHR MISSION To EGYPT: 27 MARCH - 4 APRIL 2011, 1 7,12, 13, 26, 42 (2011), available
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/EG/OHCHRMissiontoEgypt27March_4
April.pdf; Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Egypt: Emergency Law Biggest Threat to Rights
Since '25 January Revolution' (Sept. 16, 2011), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/for-
media/press-releases/egypt-emergency-law-biggest-threat-rights-%E2%80%9825-january-
revolution%E2%80%99-2011-09-1.
152. See Egypt State of Emergency Lifted After Thirty-Seven Years, BBC NEWS (May
31, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18283635; Egypt's Infamous Emer-
gency Law Expires, AL JAZEERA (May 31, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/
2012/05/2012531134021732460.html.
153. See Heba Afify, The New Faces of the Emergency Law, EGYPT INDEP. (Oct. 22,
2012), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/new-faces-emergency-law; see also MOHAMED
EL ANSARI & MOHAMED AHMED ZAREE, CAIRO INST. FOR HUMAN RIGrs STUD., SUM-
MARY OF THE REPORT: CRIMINALIZING THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 3-4 (2012), available at
http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/1 1/Report-Summary-commentary-on-5-draft-
laws-egypt-oct2012-final.pdf; Lina El-Wardani, Interior Ministry Aims to Recreate Mubarak-
Era Emergency Law: Rights Activists, AHRAM ONLINE (Oct. 22, 2012), http://english.ahram.
org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/56117/Egypt/Politics-/Interior-ministry-aims-to-recreate-Mubarak
era-emer.aspx.
154. El-Wardani, supra note 153.
155. EL ANSARI & ZAREE, supra note 153, at 5.
156. VENICE COMM'N, SCI. AND TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY, No. 12: EMERGENCY
POWERS (1995); VENICE COMM'N, SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY, No. 17:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN EMERGENCY
SITUATIONS (1996).
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devoted as much time to discussing measures of implementation as to the
substantive provisions on derogations.157 Where states of emergency are
abused and subvert the rule of law and human rights, the recourse to inter-
national review and comment may be the only remedy available. It is
therefore worthwhile to reflect a little on the general nature of interna-
tional monitoring and enforcement for states of emergency.
The ICJ's study, which focused in-depth on around fifteen countries,
noted that the efforts to apply international norms "met with a degree of
success" in five of those countries. 58 As will be discussed below, it is clear
that in practice international human rights law can have a positive impact,
though that impact may sometimes be quite limited. Within the current
architecture of the international system, there are four main ways in which
obligations concerning states of emergency and derogation are monitored
and enforced: (a) through general supervisory powers of bodies entrusted
with reviewing the implementation of treaty obligations; (b) individual
complaints to the treaty bodies, where a state's consent has been provided
for this jurisdiction; (c) interstate complaints to treaty bodies where juris-
diction is consented to; and (d) through what may be best described as
political processes in bodies of more general human rights and other
competence.159
The treaty bodies perform the central role in reviewing the implemen-
tation of states of emergency by state parties to the relevant treaties. Early
on, the U.N. Human Rights Committee asserted its competence to review
notifications under Article 4(3); while this was initially controversial, it is
now well established.160 The treaty bodies can help stimulate international
pressure through national and international publicity, and their reports
carry more weight than human rights NGOs. The state parties to the Cov-
enant are required under Article 40 to submit periodic written reports on
the implementation of all their obligations under the ICCPR, and the
Committee has provided detailed periodic reporting guidelines in respect
of Article 4.161 The periodicity of this reporting process may be every five
157. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 82.
158. ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 442. The country studies focused on Argentina, Ca-
nada, Colombia, Eastern Europe, Ghana, Greece, India, Malaysia, Northern Ireland, Peru,
Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Zaire. For review of the five positive case studies, see
id. at 442-53.
159. Id. at 441-42 (referring to the articles on page 442).
160. See NOWAK, supra note 38, at 101-02; Buergenthal, supra note 94, at 85; Hartman,
supra note 33, at 29.
161. The reporting guidelines state the following requirement: "In the light of article 4
and general comment No. 29 (2001), provide information on the date, extent of, effect of, and
procedures for imposing and for lifting any derogation under article 4. Full explanations
should be provided in relation to every article of the Covenant affected by the derogation."
H.R. Comm., Guidelines for the Treaty-Specific Document to Be Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, [ 39, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2009/1 (Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Revised Reporting Guidelines]. The guidelines
go on to request information about national arrangements and institutional procedures for
states of emergency, as well as specific and detailed information on any states of emergency
that are declared. See id. 1[ 40-44. The reporting guidelines have not always included refer-
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years or more.162 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has adopted two
general comments1 63 on the interpretation and implementation of Article
4 on states of emergency; the most recent in 2001 provided a detailed re-
view of the article's requirements. 164 The Committee has often identified
derogations as a matter of concern in its concluding observations on na-
tional reports.165 The European treaty body system, by contrast, has
neither a periodic reporting function nor a mechanism such as general
comments.
The periodic reporting by states to the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee allows the Committee to comment on specific states of emergency.
However, there are serious weaknesses in periodic reporting on states of
emergency under the Covenant. The Committee places the duty to pro-
vide information on the state resorting to Article 4,166 a duty not spelled
out in the Covenant and that the Committee has few means to enforce.
Despite the reporting guidelines, many states' notices of derogation simply
do not provide the necessary information. 167 Uruguay, for example, pro-
vided a notification to the Covenant's depositary effectively three years
after it was obligated to do so, and when questioned by the Committee
concerning the lack of information provided (such as from which articles
the state sought to derogate), the government stated that the emergency
was "a matter of universal knowledge" and any substantive justification
ence to derogations. See Buergenthal, supra note 94, at 84-85; McGoldrick, supra note 33, at
390.
162. See, e.g., Revised Reporting Guidelines, supra note 161, 1 12. There is not a set
periodicity per se, but the Committee adopts a practice of stating at the end of its concluding
observations a date by which the following periodic report should be submitted. The Com-
mittee requires the periodic reports usually every five years. This is a matter of practice that
can be changed. See H.R. Comm., Consolidated Guidelines for State Reports Under the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, B, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 (Feb.
26, 2001).
163. General comments are a practice developed primarily by U.N. human rights treaty
bodies. While not a formally binding interpretation of the treaty law, in practice they are
often influential. Philip Alston has described the General Comment as the "means by which
a UN human rights expert committee distils its considered views on an issue which arises out
of the provisions of the treaty whose implementation it supervises and presents those views
in the context of a formal statement." Philip Alston, The Historical Origins of 'General Com-
ments' in Human Rights Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN QUEST OF EQurIY
AND UNIVERSALITY 763, 764 (Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes & Vera Gowlland-Debbas
eds., 2001).
164. See generally Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Committee: General Comment 29, 2
Hum. RTs. L. REV. 81 (2002); McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 425 n.271.
165. See, e.g., H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Israel, 12, U.N. Doc. CCPRICO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) (concerning the "sweeping nature
of measures" for Israel's state of emergency in 2003). Other examples include Ecuador in
respect of an economic emergency and Guatemala in respect of a prison escape. With respect
to the Covenant, the Committee has referred generally in its reporting to a large number of
states in connection with states of emergency. See McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 393-94
(providing examples of Committee reporting).
166. See id. at 399.
167. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 92; see also infra note 281 and accompanying text.
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would be "superfluous."1 6 8 For this reason, the Committee has made clear
in General Comment 29 that the "duty of the Committee to monitor the
law and practice of a State party for compliance with article 4 does not
depend on whether that State party has submitted a notification." 169
Moreover, the process of a state's periodic reporting before the Com-
mittee on implementation of its ICCPR obligations may also occur a year
or two or more after the actual state of emergency has finished.170 While
the Committee has a general power under its rules of procedure to request
a supplementary Article 40 report "at any other time the Committee may
deem appropriate," states may challenge the legal authority of the Com-
mittee to do this, and the power has not been utilized in cases of states of
emergency. 171 States would naturally argue that their reporting obliga-
tions, at least in the short to medium term, do not extend beyond the noti-
fication requirements of Article 4. The Committee records in its annual
reports those states that have formally reported a derogation, but this is
merely a formality, as the Committee provides no substantive comments
on the actual or purported derogation.172
Although not designed with states of emergency in mind, the ability of
individuals to file complaints against states with the relevant treaty bodies
has become an important mechanism for reviewing the implementation of
treaty provisions on states of emergency.'73 This is the case, for example,
for state parties to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which pro-
vides consent to the individual-complaints mechanism of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee.174
A number of complaints have concerned state action in not only de
jure but also de facto states of emergency. This reflects that, as discussed
below concerning de facto emergencies, on many occasions the relevant
state party has not formally derogated under Article 4. While the Commit-
168. NOWAK, supra note 38, at 103 n.119.
169. General Comment No. 29, supra note 2, 1 17; see also Joseph, supra note 164, at 96
(stating that this means notification is not a substantive requirement).
170. Poland's declaration of a state of emergency is such an example. See McGoldrick,
supra note 33, at 391.
171. H.R. Comm., Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, r. 66(2), U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.9 (Jan. 13, 2011). U.N. Special Rapporteur Despouy in his report noted
that the Committee's Rules of Procedure may permit a request report from a government on
a state of emergency. See Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1 186. This au-
thority appears to be found in Article 40(1)(b) of the Covenant on further requests for infor-
mation, and the Committee has discussed the idea of additional or supplementary reports for
this purpose. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 92-95.
172. See, e.g., Rep. of the H.R. Comm., 97th-99th Sess., Oct. 12-30, 2009, Mar. 8-26,
2010, July 12-30, 2010, 1 20-27, U.N. Doc. A/65/40; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (2010).
173. The system of individual petitions under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant
has been used to address issues under Article 4. See McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 382. As
McGoldrick notes, the Committee has determined that notwithstanding the derogation, the
state party has violated its obligations. Id. at 382.
174. OPTIONAL PROTOCOL to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
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tee has little ability to enforce its decisions, the European system and its
review of decisions by the Committee of Ministers provide a stronger en-
forcement mechanism. 75 Again, however, there is a real problem of time-
liness and immediacy, as an ex post facto review several years afterward
often may do little to actually protect human rights during the emergency
situation. Furthermore, even if there is access to an individual complaints
mechanism, the consideration by the treaty body relies on a case being
brought, rather than on an automatic review of the derogation and state of
emergency and its compliance with the treaty law.
Interstate complaints concerning states of emergency are permissible
under both the Covenant and European system but are exceptionally
rare. 176 The few cases in the European system of interstate complaints
have been instances of complaints against Greece by various countries
during the Greek military dictatorship in the 1960s, against Turkey in the
1980s, and complaints by the Irish to the European Court of Human
Rights concerning U.K. emergency measures in Northern Ireland.' 77 It is
not expected that such processes will be used very much in future, mostly
due to the political disincentives and diplomatic ramifications of one state
putting another one "in the dock" for human rights issues.
There are also a wide range of relevant political processes and general
bodies with a role in reviewing implementation of the relevant treaties.
The Universal Periodic Review of the U.N. Human Rights Council is a
process that has included a focus on the implementation of Article 4 of the
Covenant.178 The Special Procedures of the U.N. Human Rights Council,
which include human rights' special rapporteurs and working groups, have
addressed states of emergency.179 Various other bodies and commissions
175. The Committee of Ministers oversees the states' changes to domestic law to
achieve compatibility with the Convention or individual measures taken by the contracting
state to redress violations. The European Court's decisions are usually complied with by the
states. For general information on the Committee, see About the Committee of Ministers,
COUNCIL EUR., http://www.coe.int/t/cm/aboutcm-en.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). For an
academic discussion, see generally Philip Leach, The Effectiveness of the Committee of Minis-
ters in Supervising the Enforcement of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 3
PuB. L. 443 (2006).
176. For provisions on interstate complaints, see, for example, ICCPR, supra note 2, art.
41; ECHR, supra note 87, art. 33.
177. The Greek Case, App. Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 3344/67, 1969 Y.B. Eur.
Conv. on H.R. 1 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
178. The U.N. General Assembly in resolution 60/251 (2006) mandated the Council to
"[u]ndertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable information, of the
fulfillment by each State of its human rights obligations and commitments in a manner which
ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States." G.A. Res.
60/251, 1 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006) (emphasis added). References to con-
cerns about states of emergencies have already featured in a number of Universal Periodic
Review reports.
179. Special Rapporteur Despouy, in his annual report, suggested that other special
rapporteurs and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention pay attention to the issue. See
Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 192. For references to states of emer-
gency in the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention's reports, see Chairperson-Rapporteur
of the Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det., Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
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of inquiry, both connected to the United Nations and otherwise, have re-
ferred to derogations and states of emergency.180
From 1985 to 1997 there was a Special Rapporteur for States of Emer-
gency mandated by the U.N. Human Rights Commission.181 The details of
the mandate are worth explaining, as it had a significant impact on the
implementation of Article 4 of the Covenant.182 The mandate in practice
included inter alia drawing up an annual list of countries under a state of
emergency, examining issues of compliance in an annual report, drawing
up guidelines for development of legislation on the issue, and providing
technical assistance. 83 The Special Rapporteur began an annual practice
of publishing a list of the countries subject to a state of emergency, which
was not limited to parties to the Covenant.184 The publication of an annual
list was a very important tool for transparency under the auspices of the
United Nations. The Special Rapporteur was also active in approaching
states and requesting information on actual or potential derogations and
72, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 18, 2010) (by El Hadji Malick Sow) [hereinafter Rep. of
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention]; Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Grp.
on Arbitrary Det., supra note 113, 64; Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Grp. on
Arbitrary Det., Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention,
59, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3 (Dec. 15, 2003) (by Leila Zerrougui); Working Grp. on Arbi-
trary Det., Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment, 1 38, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/31 (Dec. 21, 1994). There is also currently a
U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism. See Human Rights Res.
2005/80, 1 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/80 (Apr. 21, 2005).
180. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep. of the International Com-
mission of Inquiry on Libya, 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (Mar. 2, 2012); OFFICE OF THE
U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 151; Report of the Secretary-General's
Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 1 186-187 (Mar. 31, 2011), http://
www.un.org/News/dhlinfocus/SriLanka/POEReportFull.pdf; UN Human Rights Chief
Welcomes Sri Lanka Report, Urges Further Investigation into Conduct of Final Stages of the
War, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTs. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/
en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10962&LangID=E. The U.N. Committee
Against Torture, the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Or-
ganization, the Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians of the Inter-Parliamen-
tary Union, and the International Court of Justice have all dealt with these issues. See Special
Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 23.
181. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1 13.
182. The genesis for the special rapporteurship was a request of the now defunct expert
body the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities. See id. 12.
183. Id. 1 13, 14; see also Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency, The Adminis-
tration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees: Question of Human Rights and States of
Emergency, annex I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/28 (June 24, 1991) (by Leandro
Despouy).
184. The first list of states was presented to the U.N. Sub-Commission in 1987. U.N.
Special Rapporteur, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees,
1 7-8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/19/Rev.1 (Jan. 5, 1988) (by Leandro Despouy). The
fourth annual list, presented to the U.N. Sub-Commission in 1991, included sixty-one states
in formal and de facto emergencies since 1985. Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency,
supra note 183, 1 11. Even this list was likely to be incomplete. See FITZPATRICK, supra note
11, at 170-71.
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met with a good level of cooperation, perhaps not surprisingly in light of
the annual list.185 This role naturally suffered like many U.N. special rap-
porteurs, however, from a lack of resources that inhibited the mandate
holder's ability to gather and analyze information.186
The Special Rapporteur's thematic annual reports were important for
setting out issues and making recommendations. The Special Rapporteur's
final report in 1997, at the mandate's conclusion, highlighted the serious
problems and need to prioritize the issue of human rights and states of
emergency. It is regrettable that this mandate has not since been re-
newed.1 87 The final report in 1997 included a recommendation for an up-
dated General Comment, which was taken up and adopted by the
Committee in 2001.188 It is fair to say that the Special Rapporteurs' collec-
tive research and work on states of emergency moved the conceptual de-
bate forward and provided significant foundations for the updated U.N.
Human Rights Committee general comment.
There are a few key problems with monitoring and enforcement that
exist both because of and despite the current implementation architecture.
The implementation of the Article 4 obligation to declare a state of emer-
gency and notify the Secretary-General as treaty depositary has been seri-
ously deficient. The ICJ's study posits that this is for two main reasons.189
First, there is no effective or permanent procedural mechanism established
to deal specifically and systematically with derogations as they arise.190
None of the human rights treaty bodies provide for any substantive action
once a notice of derogation is received. In this regard, the U.N. Special
Rapporteurs for States of Emergency recommended there be permanent
monitoring of states of emergencies and derogations, including a mecha-
nism enabling the Committee to maintain under consideration those coun-
tries of relevance. 191
185. In preparing reports, the Special Rapporteur made requests of states for informa-
tion, which to some extent reflected an "adversary procedure" that may develop into public
debate. The practice was to send a note verbale to states requesting the fullest possible infor-
mation and, generally speaking, governments responded positively to the requests. See Spe-
cial Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 18, 64-66.
186. The Special Rapporteur noted the substantial resources required for the thorough
discharge of his mandate in his third annual list of states provided to the U.N. Sub-Commis-
sion. See Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency, The Administration of Justice and the
Human Rights of Detainees: Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency, 19 24-26,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/30 (Aug. 16, 1989) (by Leandro Despouy).
187. The Special Rapporteur's work concluded in a final report in 1997. He proposed to
the Sub-Commission that it "[m]aintain the study of the question of human rights and states
of emergency as one of the highest priority items on its agenda." Special Rapporteur's Tenth
Report, supra note 1, I1 16, 190.
188. Id. 1 187.
189. ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 454.
190. Id.; see also Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism
and Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 241, 263 (2003).
191. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1 12, 187.
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In 1982, the Dutch delegation to the Covenant's meetings of state par-
ties suggested inter alia empowering the Human Rights Committee to in-
stitute special proceedings in the event of a state of emergency. 192 The
Dutch suggestion was met with a procedural objection from the Soviet
Union delegate, and the suggestion was not taken any further.193 In 1982
and 1983, Human Rights Committee member Torkel Opsahl of Norway
proposed an Article 40(1)(b) special report for states that would be trig-
gered by a state of emergency's declaration. 194.This proposal was rejected
in the Committee on the basis of differing views on the Committee's au-
thority and competence.195 The first Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Nicole
Questiaux, also proposed that the powers of the U.N. Secretary-General
as the Covenant's depositary be extended to "seek[ing] additional infor-
mation and explanations which would be transmitted to the States Parties
and to the specialist bodies so that the international surveillance authori-
ties have sufficient material on which to reach a decision."19 This would,
however, require a substantive monitoring role for the Secretary-General,
who would need to make a judgment that the information provided by the
derogating state was insufficient and more was required. This proposal is a
large political step forward from current practice that would be strongly
resisted by many states.
Second, the notice-of-derogation requirement is often disregarded by
states without any real consequences. De facto states of emergency, essen-
tially where states fail to notify at the international level, are a common
problem to which the treaty bodies have drawn attention. 197 It has been
suggested that from 1985 to 1997 at least twenty countries were in a de
facto state of emergency. 198 The United States, for example, did not sub-
mit a notification of derogation under the Covenant after 9/11 "despite the
official national proclamation of an emergency and the imposition of a
wide range of legislative and executive policies derogating in practice from
the rights protected under the Covenant."199 The general problem of
192. NOWAK, supra note 38, at 86.
193. Id.
194. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 93 (citing Torkel Opsahl, Emergency Deroga-
tion from Human Rights, 5 NORD. J. Hum. RTs. at 4 (1987)).
195. Opsahl, supra note 194, at 4.
196. ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 454. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Deten-
tion, for example, has recommended that as soon as it is informed of such a declaration, or a
state invokes an emergency situation, an emergency mission by one of the U.N. special proce-
dures should take place to verify on the ground whether the state of emergency meets the
criteria. See Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 179, 98.
197. For a significant list of U.N. Human Rights Committee reports noting the nonre-
porting of states of emergency, see FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 91. The Special Rap-
porteur has also noted this. See Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 118.
198. Id. 1 119.
199. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 263; Frederic L. Kirgis, Alleged Secret Detentions
of Terrorism Suspects, 10 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHrs (2006), available at http://www.asil.
org/insights060214.cfm. The United States denies that Article 4 was applicable. See Second
and Third Periodic Report of the United States of American to the UN Committee on Human
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states failing to provide the required notification makes it very difficult at
the international level to obtain the information necessary to complete a
meaningful review of the lawfulness of states of emergency and deroga-
tions. The lack of information, or any international institutional trigger,
seriously weakens the efforts to address states of emergency in interna-
tional fora and bodies.200
In summary, this review of practice demonstrates that the use and
abuse of states of emergency is widespread and incongruent with its "ex-
ceptional" nature. States of emergency are central to serious human rights
violations as illustrated by the cases of Syria and Egypt. States of emer-
gency not only lead to violations of human rights during emergencies, but
also can be a tool to institutionalize illegitimate measures to protect a state
or government against dissent. As the Special Rapporteur has suggested,
"in many cases states of emergency merely became the legal means of 'le-
galizing' the worst abuses." 201 Further, in a democracy, emergency mea-
sures that violate the human rights of minorities, for example
antiterrorism measures, are often tolerated in part because they enjoy the
support of the democratic majority.
There are serious limits to the enforcement of international human
rights obligations concerning states of emergency. The power to derogate
is recognized in the international human rights treaties, but that power is
not easily protected against abuse. The usual challenges for enforcement
of IHRL are compounded by the intensity of emergency situations and the
lack of timeliness for international monitoring and review. For the treaty
bodies, there is no automatic reaction consequent to a state's formal notifi-
cation of derogation, which may be based on specious assertions and insuf-
ficient information. It can be years before the situation is properly
scrutinized for its consistency with the treaty obligations. This deficiency is
compounded by the fact that many states do not even bother to formally
derogate as they are required to do. Dubious assertions of states of emer-
gency therefore are often not seriously challenged, other than by human
rights NGOs, despite the fact that they are often closely connected to seri-
ous human rights violations.
III. PROBLEMS WITH BIFURCATING THE LEGAL QUESTION:
PUBLIC EMERGENCY AND PROPORTIONAL MEASURES
It is a foundational principle, accepted at least since 1955, that there
are two key legal questions for a state of emergency.202 The first asks
Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.S. DEP'T ST.
(Oct. 21, 2005), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/55504.htm. The U.S. position, though, is partly
driven by its refusal to accept that the Covenant's obligations may apply extraterritorially.
See id. 11 468-469.
200. See ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 455.
201. See Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 3.
202. The U.N. Human Rights Committee confirmed this in its General Comment 29.
General Comment No. 29, supra note 2, 2, 4; see also Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 45, at
630; Colin Warbrick, States of Emergency-Their Impact on Human Rights: A Comparative
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whether the emergency is of sufficient intensity to justify a derogation of
human rights; and the second examines the proportionality of the mea-
sures of derogation in response to the threat posed by the emergency situ-
ation. These foundations have not been questioned in the literature, and it
is also widely accepted that there is a conditional and temporal relation-
ship between these two basic legal questions. As McGoldrick states, the
"existence of a situation amounting to a public emergency that threatens
the life of the nation is a fundamental condition that must be met before a
state can invoke article 4."203
A. Overview of Jurisprudential Interpretation
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has dealt with only a limited
number of complaints under the Optional Protocol that concerned Article
4 of the Covenant (complaints to the Committee are also known as com-
munications). A high proportion of those complaints came from South
America, in particular Uruguay during the 1970s and 1980s. While ac-
knowledging a state's sovereign right to declare a state of emergency, the
U.N. Human Rights Committee is generally said to assert "a measure of
international supervision over that national determination." 2 0 4 In practice,
it is more accurate to suggest that in communications before it, the Com-
mittee will rarely undertake an assessment of whether the emergency situ-
ation exists but will instead focus on the measures and alleged violations of
the Covenant regardless of any derogation.205
Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay is one of the key communications that
arose from the time of Uruguay's military dictatorship and state of emer-
gency.206 The complainants had been effectively banned by an emergency
law from running for political office for fifteen years, in contravention of
Article 25 of the ICCPR. The Uruguayan government had provided no
significant information in its derogation notice on the nature of the public
emergency or measures taken to address the emergency. The Committee
did not find it necessary to clearly determine the existence of a state of
emergency. It found that, even based on "the assumption that there exists
a situation of emergency in Uruguay," the measures in question were not
Study by the International Commission of Jurists, 33 Irrr'L & COMP. L.Q. 233, 234 (1984)
(book review) ("It has long been accepted there are two major kinds of decision involved.
One is the existence of a situation of sufficient intensity to justify derogation at all; the other
is the proportionality of the extent of the derogation made by a government in response to
the measure of the threat posed by the emergency.").
203. McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 392 (emphasis added); see also Special Rapporteur's
Tenth Report, supra note 1, 34.
204. McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 399-400, 400 n.128. To support this, McGoldrick
refers to a number of communications concerning balancing of rights with national security,
but none that focused on Article 4. Id.
205. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 101.
206. Silva v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 34/1978, H.R. Comm., I 2, 3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/121D/34/1978 (Apr. 8, 1981).
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"necessary." 207 In essence, the legal assessment of the public emergency's
existence was replaced by an assumption in favor of the state's assertion.
Furthermore, in its relatively short decision, the Committee, while saying
that Uruguay could not evade the obligations of the ICCPR, further im-
plied its deference on the public emergency by emphasizing that "the sov-
ereign right of a State to declare a state of emergency is not
questioned." 208
In the Consuelo Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia communication, the
Colombian government submitted a notice of derogation to the treaty de-
positary in 1980 that made reference to the existence of a state of emer-
gency in place since 1976.209 The government asserted that this emergency
"decree was issued because of the social situation created by the activities
of subversive organizations which were disturbing public order with a view
to undermining the democratic system in force in Colombia." 210 In reach-
ing a decision, the Committee again did not determine whether or not
there was a public emergency, but instead focused primarily on the gov-
ernment having notified derogation of the incorrect ICCPR articles and
substantive rights affected by the derogation.211 While the government
had referred to "temporary measures" that limited Articles 19(2) and 21
of the Covenant (freedom of expression, right of peaceful assembly), the
Committee found in substance a violation of Article 14(5) on the right of
appeal "because Mrs. Consuelo Salgar de Montejo was denied the right to
review of her conviction by a higher tribunal."212 The Committee there-
fore failed again to address the existence of a state of emergency.
A similar approach to Landinelli Silva and Consuelo Salgar de
Montejo has been employed in other communications before the Commit-
207. See id. 8.4 (emphasis added). The Committee found that there was "no at-
tempt . .. to indicate the nature and the scope of the derogations actually resorted to with
regard to the rights guaranteed by the Covenant, or to show that such derogations were
strictly necessary." Id. 1 8.2. Rather, it found that the measures against the authors "unrea-
sonably restricted their rights under article 25 of the Covenant." Id. 9. This case has been
seen by some, such as Fitzpatrick and Ghandi, as asserting the "principle of objective review-
ability," See FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 98-100. She notes the Committee's avoidance of
the emergency question, and refers to the Uruguay communications as a "missed opportu-
nity" by the Commission. Id.
208. Silva, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/34/1978, 1 8.3.
209. de Montejo v. Colombia, Commc'n No. R.15/64, H.R. Comm., 1.2 (Dec. 18,
1979), in Rep. of the H.R. Comm., 14th-16th Sess., Oct. 19-30, 1981, Mar. 22-Apr. 9, 1982,
July 12-30, 1982, annex XV, U.N. Doc A/37/40 (Sept. 22, 1982); GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No.
40 (1982).
210. Id. 7.2.
211. See id. 10.3. General Comment 29 does not provide that notification of the sub-
stantive articles derogated is a requirement of notification. However, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee's guidelines for Article 40 periodic reports provide that for Article 4, "[flull ex-
planations should be provided in relation to every article of the Covenant affected by the
derogation." H.R. Comm., Guidelines for the Treaty-Specific Document to Be Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
T 39, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2009/1 (Oct. 4, 2010).
212. de Montejo, U.N. Doc. A/37/40, annex XV, 1$ 10.2, 11.
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tee. 2 1 3 Additionally, states of emergency have been used by states to en-
gage in violations of rights that are nonderogable under the ICCPR (such
as Article 7's prohibition against torture), meaning that the purported der-
ogation itself is irrelevant. 214 In some instances, individual Committee
members have expressed concerns as to the justification for a particular
public emergency, while in other instances some members have "suggested
that Article 4 allows states considerable latitude in deciding when a public
emergency justifie[s] derogation and that the determination concerning
the emergency situation [is] a sovereign act." 215 While the Committee has
formally preserved its ability to engage in reviewing states of emergency,
in actual fact has been reluctant to do so and has dealt with decisions in
other ways.
The main general statement on the Committee's interpretation of Ar-
ticle 4 is found in its General Comment 29 of 2001.216 This superseded an
earlier and more limited general comment that was adopted in 1981 in the
context of state reports and communications from Chile, Syria, Colombia,
and Uruguay.217 The more recent General Comment addresses a wide
range of issues, which for present purposes are not central to this Article.
In terms of what constitutes a public emergency, the Committee tried to
grapple with this issue but struggled to go much beyond the general princi-
ples already articulated in Article 4. The Committee did not attempt to
provide a comprehensive definition for a public emergency (unlike in the
Greek Case in European Convention jurisprudence, which is described be-
low). However, some of the characteristics of a public emergency that
threatens the life of the nation were described, including "armed conflict,"
"a natural catastrophe, a mass demonstration including instances of vio-
lence [and] a major industrial accident." 218 The Committee restated that
213. See, e.g., Motta v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. R.2/11, H.R. Comm., 15 (Apr. 25,
1977), in Rep. of the H.R. Comm., 8th-10th Sess., Oct. 15-26, 1979, Mar. 17-Apr. 3, 1980,
Aug. 1-July 14, 1980, annex X, U.N. Doc. A/35/40 (Sept. 18, 1980); GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp.
No. 40 (1980) (stating that the government had not "made any submissions of fact or law to
[j]ustify" derogations under Article 4); see also de Guerrero v. Columbia, Commc'n No. 45/
1979, H.R. Comm., J 3.2, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/15/D/45/1979 (Mar. 31, 1982); Touron v. Uru-
guay, Commc'n No. 32/1978, H.R. Comm., 10 (Mar. 31, 1981), reprinted in H.R. COMM.,
SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPriONAL PROTOCOL, at 61, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1,
U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.2 (1985); de Bouton v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 37/1978, H.R.
Comm., 7 (Mar. 27, 1981), reprinted in H.R. COMm., supra, at 72.
214. de Guerrero, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979, 1 12.2; Silva v. Uruguay, Commc'n
No. 34/1978, H.R. Comm., 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/34/1978 (Apr. 8, 1981). The Co-
lombian cases of state-of-emergency decrees often involved nonderogable rights, so the Com-
mittee saw no need to analyze Article 4.
215. See McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 401.
216. See generally Joseph, supra note 164 (providing a detailed review of General Com-
ment 29).
217. H.R. Comm., General Comment 5: Article 4 (Derogations) (1981), reprinted in
United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.
I) (May 27, 2008); NOWAK, supra note 38, at 86, 88.
218. General Comment No. 29, supra note 2, if 3-5.
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the emergency must threaten "the life of the nation" but did not elaborate
further on the meaning of this central phrase.
The Committee's key statement on the proportionality test was that
"the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" concerns
the "duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the state of
emergency and any measures of derogation resorted to because of the
emergency." 219 Importantly, this statement clarifies that the question of
proportionality includes an assessment of the nature of the public-emer-
gency situation.
The General Comment's overall effect in elaborating the public-emer-
gency question is more modest than is at first apparent, especially com-
pared to the rest of the General Comment, which is quite progressive. The
Committee's general statements also reflected much of what had been de-
veloped in the various codification and progressive development projects
in IHRL. However, the Committee's limited further elaboration of public
emergency has not featured centrally in any subsequent communications.
In the absence of a well-developed interpretation of the exact definition of
a public emergency, the General Comment's restatement of general prin-
ciples on public emergency provided little further clarity and left signifi-
cant discretion.
In contrast, the jurisprudence of the European system is more devel-
oped as a result of a number of cases on derogations under Article 15 of
the European Convention. As indicated above, the Convention text is
quite similar to the Covenant. The first derogations issues before the Eu-
ropean Commission of Human Rights were the Cyprus cases, which con-
cerned two interstate applications by Greece brought against the United
Kingdom in 1956 that alleged mistreatment of prisoners.220 The Commis-
sion declared itself competent to review the derogation and found in favor
of the United Kingdom, holding that "the Government should be able to
exercise a certain measure of discretion in assessing the extent [of mea-
sures] strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." 221 The Commis-
sion's measure of discretion, which was not argued by the parties, applied
only to the secondary legal question concerning proportionality, not to the
existence of the public emergency. 222
Lawless v. Ireland was the next Article 15 case, and it concerned the
government's extrajudicial detention of Irish Republican Army members
219. Id. 1 4 (emphasis added). The impact of the emergency can clearly be geographi-
cally contained, which is implicit in the Committee's indication that emergency measures can
be limited in geographic coverage. See Joseph, supra note 164, at 83.
220. Greece argued that the alleged mistreatment of prisoners in Cyprus related to obli-
gations that could not be derogated from under Article 15. Greece v. United Kingdom (First
Cyprus), App. No. 176/56, 1958-1959 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174, 174 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.).
221. Id. at 176 (emphasis added); see also Higgins, supra note 33, at 296-97.
222. Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 45, at 631.
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in Ireland (and not in Northern Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom). 223
The majority of the Commission members in the report had accepted that
a "certain discretion-a certain margin of appreciation-must be left to
the [Irish] Government" in determining a public emergency that threatens
the life of the nation (that is, an extension of the measure of discretion
from the Cyprus cases to the public-emergency question).224 The minority
of members, however, did not support this new "margin of appreciation"
concept, and argued either that the situation in Ireland did not reach the
threshold of a public emergency, or that there was no need legally for such
a determination. 225
After it was heard by the Commission, the Lawless case was then con-
sidered in the European Court of Human Rights. The Court's decision in
Lawless made clear that "it is for the Court to determine" if a government
has complied with Article 15.226 It indicated that the "natural and custom-
ary meaning" of the words of Article 15(1) were sufficiently clear as "they
refer to an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the
whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the com-
munity of which the State is composed." 227 The Court did not refer specifi-
cally to the margin of appreciation, although it upheld the Irish
government's position even though its emergency measures would have
otherwise violated the Convention. The Court's reasoning was that terror-
ist activity in Northern Ireland (that is, in the United Kingdom) was an
exceptional crisis threatening the life of Ireland as a nation. 228 There are
223. Both the Commission and Court found a violation of Article 5 of the right to lib-
erty and security, which therefore raised the question of applicability of Article 15 on deroga-
tions. See Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), App. No. 332/57, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 438,
$ 15, 20 (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 66
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1960-1961).
224. Lawless, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 82, 90 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 93-94, 98,99, 101-02.
226. Lawless, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 22.
227. Id. 28 (emphasis added). The Commission's President also raised the margin of
appreciation with the Court in the hearing. See Lawless, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408. The
French version of this statement, which was the authoritative judgment, included the word
that corresponded with "imminence." Lawless, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 28.
228. The Court found the emergency was
reasonably deduced by the Irish government from a combination of several fac-
tors, namely: in the first place, the existence in the territory of the Republic of
Ireland of a secret army engaged in unconstitutional activities and using violence
to attain its purposes; secondly, the fact that this army was also operating outside
the territory of the State, thus seriously jeopardising the relations of the Republic
of Ireland with its neighbour; thirdly the steady and alarming increase in terrorist
activities from the autumn of 1956 and throughout the first half of 1957 . ...
Id. 28. In terms of the measures' proportionality, the Court concluded that the administra-
tive detention "of individuals suspected of intending to take part in terrorist activities, ap-
peared, despite its gravity, to be a measure required by the circumstances" for five key
reasons: (i) the ordinary law was unable to check the "growing danger," (ii) ordinary courts
did not "suffice to restore peace and order," (iii) the gathering of evidence was meeting with
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various commentators who argue (quite reasonably) that terrorism in
Northern Ireland did not constitute an actual or imminent serious threat
to Ireland. 229 As one commentator noted, despite not referring to the
margin of appreciation the Court's "whole approach to the matter was
consistent with that of the Commission." 230
The Greek Case followed and were concerned with the suspension of
aspects of the Greek Constitution and rule by martial law after a military
coup in 1967.231 The Commission was faced with the unusual situation that
a military government had seized power by force. The Commission ex-
pressly acknowledged the margin of appreciation concept under Article 15
after it was pleaded by Greece. 232 This was before Greece eventually with-
drew from the Convention's jurisdiction, and the case was able to be heard
by the European Court. In a key statement of principle from the Greek
Case, the Commission, after quoting the Lawless definition of public emer-
gency, declared that a public emergency must have the following
characteristics:
(1) It must be actual or imminent.
(2) Its effects must involve the whole nation.
(3) The continuance of the organised life of the community must
be threatened.
(4) The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal
measures or restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the
maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly
inadequate. 233
The Greek military government argued that the "revolution" (that is,
the military coup) was necessary to protect the state from communists and
their allies, and that the threat from these groups had brought about the
state of emergency and the need for derogation. While the Commission
found "it established beyond dispute" that Greece had experienced politi-
cal instability, tension, and public disorder,234 it rejected the military gov-
great difficulties, (iv) the raids were carried out in Northern Ireland but prepared in Ireland,
and (v) sealing the border would have serious and disproportionate consequences. See id.
36.
229. See, e.g., FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 197; SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note
33, at 293-94.
230. A.H. Robertson, Lawless v. the Government of Ireland (Second Phase), 37 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 536, 544 (1961). The weakness of the Court's reasoning becomes clearer re-
viewing the votes of the Commission, in which five out of fourteen members concluded the
special powers were not justified by Article 15(1). Lawless, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 81.
231. The Greek Case, App. Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 3344/67, 1969 Y.B. Eur.
Conv. on H.R. 1 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
232. Id. 91 152 (quoting Lawless, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 28).
233. Id. 1 153.
234. Id. 11 59, 156.
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ernment's arguments. 235 The conclusion adopted by ten of fifteen
Commission members was that there was no public emergency. 236 There-
fore, the Commission applied similar principles as it and the Court applied
in the Lawless case, although it reached the opposite result. As Svensson-
McCarthy points out, though, as "compared to the Lawless case, the
Greek situation was .. . marked by much more violence and unrest within
the national borders." 237 In addressing the "public emergency" in Greece,
the Commission effectively "lifted the veil" by considering the causation of
the public emergency. This point was recognized by the dissenting opinion
of Judge Ermacora, who observed that there was a public emergency as
defined by the Convention, but that it seemed "incompatible" for the gov-
ernment to have resort to Article 15 since it was the government itself that
was responsible for the situation.238
There have been various European cases since the Lawless and Greek
cases that have built on the jurisprudential foundations of these early
cases. 239 Ireland v. United Kingdom is one worth explaining, as it sheds
some further light on the test of proportionality. This was an interstate
case concerning various measures adopted in Northern Ireland by the
British government. The two state parties had agreed there was a state of
emergency, and the Court found that the "degree of violence, with bomb-
ing, shooting and rioting was on a scale far beyond what could be called
minor civil disorder." 240 In this case, the Commission and Court modified
one aspect of their prior reasoning by accepting that the emergency was
limited to Northern Ireland and therefore did not need to affect the entire
nation (as set out in the Greek Case).
The Court in Ireland then developed the discussion on proportionality
in such a way as to demonstrate the close connection between the public-
emergency situation and the emergency measures. It stated that in view of
the "massive wave of violence and intimidation," the government was
"reasonably entitled to consider that normal legislation offered insufficient
resources for the campaign against terrorism and that recourse to mea-
sures outside the scope of the ordinary law, in the shape of extrajudicial
deprivation of liberty, was called for." 241 At the same time as considering
the measures in light of the public emergency, the Court stated that it was
not its "function to substitute for the British Government's assessment any
235. The Commission did not find that there was a real risk of a creation of a commu-
nist government at the pending elections, nor that there would be public disorder beyond the
capability of the powers of police to control. See id. IT 159, 164.
236. Id. 1 165 n.290.
237. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 305.
238. The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 213-215 (dissenting opinion of
Mr. Ermacora).
239. E.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260; Brannigan v. United Kingdom,
258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1993); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1978).
240. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 117 (1976).
241. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 81.
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other assessment of what might be the most prudent or most expedient
policy to combat terrorism." 2 4 2 The Court concluded that "the limits of
the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States by Article 15 § I
were not overstepped by the United Kingdom when it formed the opinion
that extrajudicial deprivation of liberty was necessary from August 1971 to
March 1975."243 The Court accordingly left no doubt concerning the de-
gree of its deference to the derogating state.244 In subsequent cases, the
Court has continued to provide only cursory analysis of the factual basis
for the state of emergency and has not overruled any government's asser-
tion of a public emergency.245
The Court's decision in 2009 in A & Others v. United Kingdom, the
Belmarsh Detainees case, was therefore eagerly awaited as an opportunity
to settle the jurisprudence. It was the Court's first pronouncement for
some time on Article 15, including after the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks, and also ultimately resulted in a unanimous decision of the Grand
Chamber (the highest level within the Court). The case concerned legisla-
tion providing for indefinite detention without trial of foreign nationals
suspected of terrorism that the United Kingdom was unable to deport.
The detention framework had been established pursuant to an Article 15
derogation by the United Kingdom. In the House of Lord's decision of
2004, it was held that the existence of the public emergency was a "politi-
cal question" not for the court, but that the proposed measures would not
242. Id. at 82.
243. Id.
244. The Court stated:
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for
"the life of [its] nation", to determine whether that life is threatened by a "public
emergency" and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the
emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing
needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position
than the international judge to decide both on the presence of an emergency and
on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter Article
15 ... leaves those authorities a wide margin of appreciation.
Id. at 78-79. Yet as a claw back, although perhaps not a convincing one, the Court added that
states "do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect," and the "domestic margin of appre-
ciation is . .. accompanied by a European supervision." See id. For discussion, see FITZPAT-
RICK, supra note 11, at 198.
245. For example, the full treatment of the situation of emergency issues was as follows
in the Aksoy case: "The Court considers, in light of all the material before it, that the particu-
lar extent and impact of PKK terrorist activity in South-East Turkey has undoubtedly cre-
ated, in the region concerned, a 'public emergency threatening the life of the nation."' See
Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 70. In other cases such as Brannigan, the
Court has noted generally that it "must give appropriate weight to such relevant factors as
the nature of the rights affected by the emergency derogation, the circumstances leading to,
and the duration of, the emergency situation." Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 50, 43 (1993). This is applied questionably in practice. See SVENSSON-
MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 591.
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be proportionate and therefore were a violation. 246 There was a vocal dis-
senting judgment by Lord Hoffman asserting that the terrorist threat was
indeed a question for the court and did not amount to a threat to the life
of the nation. In Hoffman's view, "[tierrorist violence, serious as it is, does
not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil
community." 247
The European Court of Human Rights dealt with the case in a quite
different way from the House of Lords. It endorsed a general position for
a wide margin of appreciation, both on existence of the emergency and the
proportionality of measures. It stated:
The Court recalls that it falls to each Contracting State, with
its responsibility for "the life of [its] nation", to determine
whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so,
how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emer-
gency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the
pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in prin-
ciple better placed than the international judge to decide both on
the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of
the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a
wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national
authorities. 248
The European Court was deferential to, rather than concerned by, the
fact that the United Kingdom was the only European government that felt
it necessary to derogate under the Convention post-9/11. 249 The Court dis-
missed the dissenting opinion of Lord Hoffman, relied on by the applicant,
by stating that Hoffman had "interpreted the words as requiring a threat
246. See A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2
A.C. 68, IT 29, 43 (appeal taken from Eng.).
247. Id. 1 96. Lord Hoffman stated:
This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has survived physi-
cal destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate the ability of
fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of
the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no
doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda.... The real threat to the life of the nation,
in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political
values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.
Id. I 96, 97.
248. A & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, 173 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91403 (emphasis added); see also
id. 184.
249. Id. 180. The Court said:
While it is striking that the United Kingdom was the only Convention State to
have lodged a derogation in response to the danger from al'Qaeda, although other
States were also the subject of threats, the Court accepts that it was for each Gov-
ernment, as the guardian of their own people's safety, to make their own assess-
ment on the basis of the facts known to them.
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to the organised life of the community which went beyond a threat of seri-
ous physical damage and loss of life."250 The Court said it had in the past
concluded emergency situations existed even though "the institutions of
the State did not appear to be imperilled to the extent envisaged by Lord
Hoffman." 251 However, the Court said little regarding the interpretation
of its own threshold (that is, "a threat of serious physical damage and loss
of life") and merely referred to taking into account a "broader range of
factors" than Hoffman.252
This acceptance of a state of emergency in the United Kingdom before
any actual terrorist attack by Al Qaeda or its sympathizers provided a
broad precedent for the applicable threshold in many other situations. The
public emergency did not threaten the United Kingdom's institutions, but
rather it seemed (judging from Hoffman's dissent and the fact that the
court did not reject this point) based in substance on a threat to the safety
of the British people. Most concerning, however, was the Court's conclu-
sion that it "accordingly shares the view of the majority of the House of
Lords that there was a public emergency threatening the life of the na-
tion." 253 This assessment was simply incorrect. The House of Lords had
made it clear that it deferred to the British executive and legislature as the
public emergency was a political question of "relative institutional compe-
tence," rather than applying a margin of appreciation and retaining the
ultimate power to judicially review (as the European Court did).254
The European Court agreed with the House of Lords (accurately this
time) that "the question of proportionality is ultimately a judicial deci-
sion," 255 though for the Court this was complemented by a professed wide
margin of appreciation. 256 This is reflected in the threshold the Court er-
ected for interfering with the national determination of the public emer-
gency: "the Court considers that it would be justified in reaching a
contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had misinter-
preted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence under that
Article or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable."257
Id. The Court also indicated that the House of Lords is part of the "national authorities" for
the purposes of the margin of appreciation and takes the position of being deferential to the
House of Lord's decision. Id. 91 174.
250. Id. 179 (emphasis added).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. 1 181.
254. A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C.
68, 9 29 (appeal taken from Eng.); see also infra note 330 (quoting Lord Bingham of
Cornwall).
255. A & Others, App. No. 3455/05, 1 184.
256. Id.
257. Id. 9 174 (emphasis added). To add to the conceptual confusion, the Court states
that for a "fundamental right," such as the right to liberty, the Court will consider whether it
is a "genuine response to the emergency situation," to ensure is the measures are "fully justi-
fied by the special circumstances of the emergency," and whether "adequate safeguards were
provided against abuse." Id. J 184 (emphasis added). The right to liberty has been engaged in
536 [Vol. 34:491
Reconceptualizing States of Emergency
This regrettably suggested that misinterpretation, misapplication, or mani-
fest abuse were the real standards by which the Grand Chamber would set
aside the deferential margin of appreciation, rather than measures that
cannot be shown as "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation"
(that is, the wording of Article 15). Finally, the Court also rejected the
U.N. Human Rights Committee's view that measures must be exceptional
and temporary in nature. The Court stated that it "has never, to date, ex-
plicitly incorporated the requirement that the emergency be temporary,
although the questions of proportionality of the response may be linked to
the duration of the emergency." 258
The unanimous decision by the Grand Chamber of the European
Court in A & Others served only to consolidate the problems in the Euro-
pean jurisprudence on Article 15. The case stands for general principles
that simply do not work, are not able to protect human rights during an
emergency, and are internally inconsistent. It provided a weak threshold
for both the emergency situation and proportionality of measures, includ-
ing by expressly endorsing a wide margin of appreciation on both legal
questions-public emergency and proportionality of measures. However,
the foundations of the Grand Chamber's reasoning in A & Others, includ-
ing on margin of appreciation, are not rock solid, due to a feeling that
perhaps the Court would have reasoned differently if there had been no
House of Lords decision to rely on. Even if so, the judicial reasoning is
hardly satisfying.
In summation, a review of the European jurisprudence evidences a
pattern of caution and deference in which the Court has failed to impose
strict and objective standards for derogations. 259 Since Lawless, the mar-
gin of appreciation has featured in all cases before the Commission and
the Court on derogations, and more recently it has usually been a wide
margin of appreciation. Aside from the Greek Case, the Commission and
Court have consistently adopted a deferential approach to governments'
assertions of a public emergency. 260 The European judiciary "chose to de-
fer to the 'better position' of the national authorities both to determine the
nearly all the Article 15 cases, and these tests and principles if applied would be inconsistent
with any margin of appreciation.
258. Id. 1 178. The U.N. Human Rights Committee by contrast states that the
"[m]easures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be exceptional and tempo-
rary in nature." See General Comment No. 29, supra note 2, 1 2 (emphasis added).
259. As Svensson-McCarthy comments on the European jurisprudence, "[c]onsiderable
uncertainty also surrounds the question of the burden of proof and the level of evidence
required to show the existence of a public emergency." SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note
33, at 324, 618. The ostensibly robust standards discussed above-that is, "strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation," see ECHR, supra note 87, art. 15, "the crisis or danger must
be exceptional," The Greek Case, App. Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 3344/67, 1969 Y.B.
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 1, 153 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)-have fallen by the wayside. Hartman
states that the use of the margin of appreciation has "prevented interpretation of 'strictly
required' meaning essential or indispensable." Hartman, supra note 33, at 31, 32, 35.
260. See FITzPATRICK, supra note 11, at 197.
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existence of an emergency and to select measures." 261 This makes it diffi-
cult to see how the Convention can protect human rights in an emergency
in Europe, or more importantly to see how people may be protected from
abuse by governments in a state of emergency. Furthermore, with the
Grand Chamber decision in A & Others, it is now settled case law that a
wide margin of appreciation applies to both the determination of an emer-
gency and proportionality of measures.
B. Conceptual Challenges in the Jurisprudence
The U.N. and European jurisprudence on states of emergency and
derogations reveal a number of key themes and issues that challenge the
effective interpretation and application of IHRL. There are three particu-
lar issues that engage conceptual problems and that may also concern the
underlying theoretical debates mentioned above in Part I. These issues will
each be discussed in turn below: (a) the margin of appreciation, (b) terror-
ism as a public emergency, and (c) causation and protection of the govern-
ment from opposition.
1. Margin of Appreciation
The margin of appreciation is commonly explained as the idea that
each European society is "entitled to certain latitude in resolving the in-
herent conflicts between individual rights and national interests or differ-
ent moral convictions." 2 6 2 The margin of appreciation is the central
conceptual problem of the European jurisprudence on states of emer-
gency. While not mentioned in the travaux prdparatoires of the European
Convention,263 it has become integral to the cases and has also been en-
dorsed in the Venice Commission opinion concerning the protection of
261. Id. at 201 (referring to the Lawless and Ireland cases).
262. Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 843-44; see also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of
Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the
Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 115-16 (2005); Lord Lester, The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights in the New Architecture of Europe: General Report, in 8th Interna-
tional Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights, Budapest, Hung., Sept.
20-23, 1995, at 227, 237. Its supporters "endors[e] the doctrine as a realistic and appropriate
tool by which an international court facilities its dialogue concerning sensitive matters with
national legal and political systems and with their unique values and particular needs,...
reflect[ing] the twin aspects of subsidiarity and cultural diversity." Gross & Ni Aoldin, supra
note 45, at 627. It has been seen as balancing the sovereignty of states with the need to ensure
the observance of the human rights obligations in the Convention. See R. St. J. Macdonald,
The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 83, 123 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
263. See, e.g., HOWARD CHARLES YOURow, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION Doc-
TRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1996); see also
Michael R. Hutchinson, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of
Human Rights, 48 Ir'L & COMP. L.Q. 638, 639 (1999); Nicholas Lavender, The Problem of
the Margin of Appreciation, 4 EUR. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 380, 381 (1997); McHarg, supra note
41.
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human rights in emergency situations.264 By contrast, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee has rejected the margin of appreciation for interpreta-
tion of the Covenant.265 While the concept is used now in a range of ways
in European Convention cases,266 its genesis was the Cyprus, Lawless, and
Greek cases concerning states of emergency. A key second and subsequent
use of the concept has been to apply a margin of appreciation to the differ-
ent social values in Europe in cases on freedom of expression and religion.
This use may be seen as advancing judicial self-restraint on difficult is-
sues.267 It is also said to be closely connected to the democratic nature and
processes of the states parties to the Convention.268 This rationale engages
some of the more theoretical debates in Part I above, such as separation of
powers and democracy as a check on emergency powers.
While the margin of appreciation is now a well-established part of Eu-
ropean jurisprudence, its "exact ambit and role are far from being fully
developed." 269 As evidenced above, in the A & Others case, the margin of
appreciation and Article 15's requirements are prima facie not easily rec-
onciled despite the desire for them to be perceived as such. The Venice
Commission unfortunately succumbed to these inherent contradictions
when it stated that "[a]lthough the state authorities enjoy a margin of ap-
preciation, they must not go beyond what is necessary or proportion-
ate." 2 7 0 There is strong inconsistency in the application of this concept,
264. Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 1 19 ("Nonetheless, Contracting States are allowed
a 'margin of appreciation' being the latitude or discretion allowed to a State in its laws and
how it enforces them. This margin of appreciation extends to the choice of means to be used
by the authorities to ensure that lawful demonstrations take place peacefully and to what
extent interference is necessary.").
265. This is the case even though express reference to this doctrine was made during the
early discussions the Third (Human Rights) Committee in 1963. See Rep. of the 3d Comm.,
Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, 49, U.N. Doc. A15655 (Dec. 10, 1963) (by
Refslund Thomsen); YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION Doc.
TRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EHCR 17
(2002).
266. Examples include for the protection of public morals and children's literature. See
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1976). For an extensive list of
the cases, issues, and articles, see The Margin of Appreciation, COUNCIL EUR., http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/ECHR/Paper2_en.asp (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013).
267. See Higgins, supra note 33, at 313. But see Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 45, at
628.
268. Gross & Ni Aoldin, supra note 45, at 628. "James Fawcett has suggested that the
margin of appreciation occupies a middle position between what a democratic State consid-
ers necessary and what is objectively necessary to attain a permitted end." Higgins, supra
note 33, at 313; see also SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 305.
269. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 318. It has also frustrated attempts at
universal standards. See Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 845; see also Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra
note 45, at 635 ("There are few cases, relatively speaking, in which the Court has made any
real effort to delineate the criteria and parameters that are taken into consideration when
deciding the actual use of the doctrine in a given case.").
270. Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 39 (emphasis added) (speaking in the context of
freedom of assembly).
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and the results range from an objective examination of the limitations of
the margin to a total abdication by the courts and tribunals of their role in
assessing states' compliance. The heart of the problem is the subjectivity
and elasticity of the margin of appreciation concept, which is further com-
pounded by invoking either a wide or narrow margin.
The margin of appreciation concept has become a tool that provides
an easy way out for the European Court when faced with difficult state-of-
emergency cases. As Svensson-McCarthy accurately sums it up:
[W]hen the Court emphasises the limits of its powers of review
under Art. 15 at the same time as it grants a "wide" margin of
discretion to the High Contracting Parties, it inevitably conveys
the impression of wanting to avoid having to make rulings against
governments except in manifestly abusive cases.271
In this regard, the Court "essentially reverts difficult policy questions back
to national institutions, in complete disregard of their weaknesses." 272 The
margin of appreciation's inherent deference to states to resolve difficult
political and moral decisions is in part justified by the liberal democratic
nature of the states, and thus an inherent faith by the courts in the legiti-
macy and lawfulness of their decisions rooted in liberal democratic theory.
Yet the context in which the margin is most frequently applied illustrates
an inherent contradiction between this rationale and another inherent as-
pect of liberal democracy: the role of the judicial branch and the law in
safeguarding the minority against a "tyranny of the majority." Thus, as
Eyal Benvenisti points out, a doctrine grounded in the legitimacy of demo-
cratic decision making is inappropriate where the conflict concerns treat-
ment of the minority by the majority-a province of the judiciary in liberal
democratic theory.273 Nearly all the European cases on states of emer-
gency can be cast as involving treatment of minorities by majorities (for
example, Northern Ireland and Catholics, Turkey and the Kurds, the
United Kingdom and foreigners of Arab origins).
271. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 314-15; see also Benvenisti, supra note 8,
at 844 ("Inconsistent applications in seemingly similar cases due to different margins allowed
by the court might raise concerns about judicial double standards."). As the ICJ report states,
there is potential for a "'double standard' or a reluctance to scrutinize closely the actions of a
country enjoying a generally positive image with regard to human rights practices." See ICJ
STUDY, supra note 38, at 455. Gross and Nf Aoldin in their major study suggested that the
"deep reasons for the [European jurisprudence] according the widest margin of apprecia-
tion ... are not explicitly stated in the Court's judgments." Gross & Ni Aoldin, supra note 45,
at 637. These seem to include the difficulty in replicating the conditions for the decision that
the government faced at the time, the "considerations of the Court's own legitimacy particu-
larly as a supranational body seeming to intervene in matters so close to 'raw' nerves of
national sovereignty," and the "realization that proper functioning of the Convention system
depends on the cooperation of states in the absence of meaningful enforcement mecha-
nisms." Id.
272. Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 853.
273. See id. at 853-54.
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Despite the problems with the margin of appreciation, even some of
its strongest critics do not advocate that it be done away with entirely, but
rather applied restrictively. 274 Higgins, for example, criticizes the concept
but suggests that the margin of appreciation applies to the existence of the
state of emergency only and not to the proportionality of measures. 275 The
challenge to this suggestion is determining whether the two questions-
public emergency and proportionality of measures-are sufficiently mutu-
ally exclusive to apply the margin of appreciation to one and not the other.
As demonstrated above, the judicial assessment of proportionality re-
quires the "exigencies of the situation" to be the yardstick against which
the proportionality of any measures are considered. Where there is judi-
cial deference (that is, through the margin of appreciation) or avoidance in
assessing the emergency situation, there is a risk that the proportionality
assessment takes place in the context of a government's inaccurate and
unsubstantiated assertion of a public emergency. In other words, a court
may need to consider the proportionality of measures that might be justi-
fied by a legitimate public emergency, but in a context where the court has
already deferred to a government's unjustified assertion of public emer-
gency. This can lead to a substantive deference to the government's assess-
ment, which in turn corrupts the juridical assessment of proportionality
since in reality the threshold of public emergency has not even been met.
Svensson-McCarthy is the sole commentator of IHRL who has begun
to grapple with this complex issue and recognizes the symbiotic relation-
ship between the two legal questions. She notes in the Ireland v. United
Kingdom context that the reasoning "contains a fundamental contradic-
tion, which follows from the fact that the Court expressly declined to make
its own assessment of the strict necessity of the emergency measures on
the ground that its task was limited to reviewing the 'lawfulness' of the
derogatory measures under the Convention." 276 The problem with Hig-
gins's and others' suggestion is that it does provide some logical support
for the A & Others finding by the European Court that the margin of
appreciation is applied to both questions, since it is not really possible to
apply it only to the public-emergency question.
2. Terrorism: Threat, Duration, and Imminence
Terrorism poses a significant conceptual challenge to avoiding the
abuse of states of emergency. In interpreting the ICCPR, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee's General Comment 29 does not even mention terror-
ism as one of the frequent bases invoked for a state of emergency. How-
ever, while not discussed at the time of the negotiations of the Covenant
274. See, e.g., Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 45, at 648-49 ("Only the narrowest of
margins should be accorded the derogating government.").
275. See Higgins, supra note 33, at 299-300 ("This writer believes that there are good
reasons for not embracing the notion of margin of appreciation in regard to the existence of a
public emergency, if that phrase amounts to anymore more than a mere reminder to the
Commission that it may be difficult for it to verify all its facts.").
276. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 600.
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and European Convention, terrorism has become frequently invoked by
states as the basis of an emergency and is the mainstay of the relevant
cases in the European system. As is well known, the meaning of terrorism
is controversial and it is not a clearly defined term under international
law.2 7 7 The distinction between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters" was
contentious in the context of colonial oppression and states of emergency
and still is today in situations such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
the Kurds in Turkey, and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
While opposing views exist, 278 it is not controversial to accept that
terrorism may form the basis of a state of emergency. Terrorism may be
viewed as a threat to the life of the nation, where "life of the nation" may
refer to the physical population, the state's territorial integrity, or the
function of the organs of the state.279 It is very likely there are points in
the history of Northern Ireland and Israel, for example, where terrorism
has provided sufficient justification for the derogation of human rights
under the relevant treaties. The robust focus of states on combating terror-
ism is well justified, but it has become mixed up with other issues, and
whether or not it forms a justified basis of derogation in any particular
situation is often problematic. The heart of the problem is that most ter-
rorism is targeted at creating ongoing fear in the civilian population, and,
as such, it often may not threaten the institutions of state and governance,
nor be exceptional or temporary in nature. The point at which the threat
of terrorism reaches the threshold necessary to satisfy a public emergency
that requires derogation of human rights obligations is unclear.
In A & Others, the European Court of Human Rights drew a parallel
between Northern Ireland and the British situation post-9/11 to justify the
argument that terrorism may constitute a state of emergency. In making
the comparison, the Court, quoting from Ireland v. United Kingdom, re-
ferred to "a particularly far-reaching and acute danger for the territorial
integrity of the United Kingdom." 280 The British notice of derogation
post-9/11 used the terminology of a "terrorist threat" and "national secur-
ity" to describe the public emergency but did not go beyond this to iden-
tify the nature or impact of the threat. Additionally, the derogation was at
a time prior to any attacks on the United Kingdom. 281 As mentioned
above, Lord Hoffman provided a dissenting opinion and focused on the
lack of threat to "our institutions of government or our existence as a civil
277. See, e.g., Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy,
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis, at 3 (Spe-
cial Trib. for Leb. Feb. 16, 2011).
278. See, e.g., Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Specific
Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, in Particular Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, 37,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/30 (Aug. 3, 2006) (by Kalliopi K. Koufa) ("In general, only cer-
tain mercenary groups, not terrorist groups, have the capacity to threaten the existence of a
State, and then only a small or poorly defended one.").
279. See Siracusa Principles, supra note 11, princ. 39(b).
280. A & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, $ 184 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91403.
281. The U.K. government states in its derogation order that
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community." 282 The European Court in A & Others rejected his argument
and indicated that there was an "urgent need to protect the population of
the United Kingdom from terrorist attack." 283 While there were similari-
ties in the Ireland and A & Others cases, there were also great differences,
particularly in the material impact that the Irish Republican Army had on
the U.K. nation and its people as compared to the nascent Al Qaeda
threat at that time.
The level of threat also needs to be considered alongside the nature of
the threat in the context of proportionality of measures directed at that
threat. The A & Others case, for example, illustrates a misconception by
the United Kingdom of the threat forming the basis of its derogation. The
British derogation identified "foreign nationals" in particular as the threat,
and they were the target of the measures complained of and ultimately
found in violation of the Convention. The Grand Chamber in A & Others
referred to the 2005 London bombings, four years after the British deroga-
tion, to demonstrate that the public emergency was real and justified.284
What the Chamber did not acknowledge was that the bombers were all
British nationals and therefore not subject to the derogation actually in
question (as the derogation addressed foreigners only). These finer but
important points tend to get lost in the rhetoric of the "war on terror,"
which is used to justify extensive recourse by government to emergency
powers.285
The principle that proportionality in part relies on the imminence of
the threat posed by the public emergency, which has its origins in the
Greek Case, has been repeatedly endorsed by commentators, including in
scholarly IHRL projects. The Siracusa Principles ON THE LIMITATION AND
[t]here exists a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from persons suspected of
involvement in international terrorism. In particular, there are foreign nationals
present in the United Kingdom who are suspected of being concerned in the com-
mission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism, of being
member of organisations or groups which are so concerned or of having links with
members of such organisations or groups, and who are a threat to the national
security of the United Kingdom.
Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, S.I. 2001/3644 (U.K.), availa-
ble at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/3644/made. The United Kingdom also justified
its state of emergency by referring to U.N. Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, where
the attacks were explicitly recognized as a "threat to international peace and security" and a
"serious challenge and threat to international security." Id. art. 2, 2 (referring to S.C. Res.
1368, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2012) and S.C. Res 1373, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)).
282. A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C.
68, 1 96 (appeal taken from Eng.).
283. A & Others, App. No. 3455/05, T 216.
284. See id. 177.
285. This point has been the subject of significant literature. See, e.g., AGAMBEN, supra
note 12, at 15-19; Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 252; Humphreys, supra note 13, at 679-80.
543Spring 2013]
Michigan Journal of International Law
DEROGATION OF PROVISIONS IN THE ICCPR,286 for example, provide that
"[e]ach measure shall be directed to an actual, clear, present or imminent
danger and may not be imposed merely because of an apprehension of
potential danger."287 The juridical application of this principle and the pre-
cise and somewhat arbitrary distinction between imminence and potential-
ity is fraught. There is no example of a case involving terrorism where a
treaty body has dealt seriously with this imminence issue, although it has
featured in dissenting opinions. In the Lawless case, for example, five Eu-
ropean Commission on Human Rights members dissented against the
finding that the terrorist threat was a public emergency. Four of the mem-
bers effectively suggested that the situation had not reached the threshold
of public emergency, as it had persisted in a virtually unchanged form for
years, and that the Commission had been overly deferential to the Irish
Government's assertion.288 The other Commission member adopted a
similar position, but also indicated that he was not convinced it was neces-
sary as a general matter to even make a legal determination of a public
emergency. 289
The essentially temporary nature of a state of emergency is part of its
philosophical heritage and is also a confirmed principle in the literature.290
The U.N. Human Rights Committee stated in General Comment 29 that
"[t]he restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect for the Cove-
nant can again be secured must be the predominant objective of a State
party derogating from the Covenant." 291 As discussed above in Part II
286. Siracusa Principles, supra note 11, 1 (i). The Siracusa Principles were the output of
a group of thirty-one experts in international law, convened in 1984 by the ICJ, the Interna-
tional Association of Penal Law, the American Association for the ICJ, and the Urban Mor-
gan Institute for Human Rights, and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences. Id.
287. Id. 91 54 (emphasis added). Svensson-McCarthy, for example, defines an imminent
threat as one "on the verge of breaking out at any moment." SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra
note 33, at 299 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 3, 292. Grossman states: "[Tihe cause must
be a real or imminent event. Mere potential dangers, latent or speculative in nature, do not
warrant the proclamation of emergency conditions." Grossman, supra note 14, at 42. Orad,
for example, considers "imminent" to exclude any crisis situations that, however dangerous,
are still only potentially so serious as to actually threaten the life of the nation. ORAA, supra
note 15, at 27.
288. Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 94-102 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R. 1960-1961).
289. Id. at 93.
290. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1 69; Special Rapporteur of the
Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Question of the
Human Rights of Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 9 69, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15 (July 27, 1982) (by N. Questiaux); SUBRATA RoY CHOWDHURY,
RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS NORMS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 5 (1989); PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra
note 11, 1 3(a); ORAA, supra note 15, at 30.
291. General Comment No. 29, supra note 2, 1 1 (emphasis added). Special Rapporteur
Questiaux had stated something similar: "After this analysis, one clear fact emerges: above
and beyond the rules which have just been enunciated, one principle, namely, the principle of
provisional status, dominates all others. The right of derogation can be justified solely by the
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concerning practice and problems, this suggestion has been honored in the
breach, particularly for public emergencies based on terrorist threats. The
European jurisprudence, for example, has focused mostly on the United
Kingdom and Turkey and their respective terrorist emergencies. 292 North-
ern Ireland was subject to an entrenched terrorist emergency for nearly
thirty years, and Turkey was engaged in a similar conflict for most of the
time between 1970 and 1987, including almost the entirety of the seven
years from 1980 to 1987.
More recently, the temporality issue has become important since 9/11,
Al Qaeda, and the "war on terror." 293 The war against terrorism has
risked becoming an entrenched state of emergency or "the permanent
emergency." 294 As Fitzpatrick commented, "[n]o territory is contested; no
peace talks are conceivable; progress is measured by the absence of at-
tacks, and success in applying control measures (arrests, intercepted com-
munications, interrogations, and asset seizures). The duration of
'hostilities' is measured by the persistence of fear that the enemy retains
the capacity to strike."295 In this regard, with a semiperpetual nature and
the difficulty of threat assessment, terrorism poses a great problem for
juridical assessment based on the agreed principles for states of emer-
gency. Terrorism can become a form of entrenched public emergency that
breaks down the theoretical distinction between the normal and the excep-
tional or even stretches the exceptional to become the norm.296 The justifi-
cation offered to the U.N. Human Rights Committee by Israel in 1998 on
its state of emergency demonstrates the point well:
[O]n the one hand, the State and its citizens have been subjected
without cease to a grimly real existential threat, to an ongoing
state of war with some of its neighbours whose policies still aim at
Israel's destabilization or destruction, to campaigns of political vi-
olence which continue to exact a dreadful toll, and to full-scale
armed conflict six times in nearly 50 years. On the other hand,
aside from those periods of all-out war, Israel's civil and govern-
mental institutions generally function uninterruptedly in normal
fashion in the midst of the continuing conflict. As a matter of po-
litical reality, Israel's needs for a formal state of emergency will
concern to return to normality." Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, supra note 290, $ 69.
292. See the examples provided by Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 45, at 645-46.
293. As pointed out, 9/11 and the "war on terror" were not new for issues of state
emergency; rather, as Dyzenhaus says, "all that is new is the prevalence of the claim that this
emergency has no foreseeable end and so is permanent." DYZENHAUS, supra note 12, at 2.
294. Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 251.
295. Id.
296. See Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 45, at 645.
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abate when it succeeds in concluding and implementing formal
peace arrangements in the region. 297
For entrenched states of emergency, in particular ones founded on
threats of terrorism, time limits are often mentioned as a tool of mitiga-
tion. The U.N. Sub-Commission's updated Preliminary Framework Draft
of Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Terrorism provided
that "[g]reat care should be taken to ensure that exceptions and deroga-
tions that might have been justified because of an act of terrorism meet
strict time limits and do not become perpetual features of national law or
action."298 This conflicts obviously with the Israeli government's argu-
ments set out above. The idea of limited duration for states of emergency
is reflected in many states' legal systems, 299 but as has been the case in
Egypt, the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, and other states, this is not an
effective constraint, as often the emergency measures continue to be peri-
odically renewed without much difficulty. The slippery slope from excep-
tion to norm illustrated by the use of terrorism to justify a state of
emergency has also provided many states with a strong pretext for en-
trenched, institutionalized, and unjustified states of emergency. While it is
a comfort that normal laws can address new terrorist threats, it has also
meant that antiterrorism laws have in some cases become a safe haven for
de facto emergency laws.300
3. Causation and Protection of the Government
The literature and jurisprudence on states of emergency does not fo-
cus on the issue of causation of the state of emergency. To the extent that a
government is responsible for a violent crackdown on generally peaceful
protests, triggering a state of emergency, there may be an inherent prob-
lem with causation of the public emergency. The U.N. Commission on
Human Rights' debates in the 1950s recognized that it was difficult to give
a precise definition to "the life of the nation" but it "was significant that
297. H.R. Comm., Initial Report of States Parties Due in 1993: Israel, J 123, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/Add.13 (June 2, 1998).
298. See Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, supra note
278, 11 24, 37(b), 42.
299. See, e.g., 1958 CONST. art. 16 (Fr.) (permitting referral of the emergency after thirty
days to the Constitutional Council, the President of the Senate, sixty Members of the Na-
tional Assembly, or sixty Senators, and requiring a decision by them after sixty days on the
continuance of the state of emergency); Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (Can.) (referring
to "special temporary measures"); Emergency Act 67 of 1977 § 2(1)(a) (S. Afr.) ("The Presi-
dent may ... make such regulations as are necessary or expedient to restore peace and order
and to make adequate provision for terminating the state of emergency.").
300. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 285-86 (2001) (outlining the Act's "sneak and peak" provisions);
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 24-31 (Eng.) (prescribing special
immigration procedures for suspected terrorists), considered in case cited supra note 246.
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the text did not relate to the life of the government or of the state."o30 This
feeds into the point made by some commentators that a state of emer-
gency cannot be invoked merely to defend a government against its politi-
cal opponents. 302 While the Greek Case is a key example, the causation
issue (that is, the military coup or revolution) was only raised in a few of
the dissenting opinions of the European Commission members.303 Simi-
larly, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has only once recognized the
causation issue, and then only impliedly, when in 1979 it examined Chile's
continuing state of emergency and implied that the cause of the emergency
was the military junta itself.304
In practice, the suppression of political dissent is unfortunately a
rather common use of emergency measures, as demonstrated to varying
degrees by Arab Spring countries such as Syria and Egypt. A government
can use force to create a situation of violence that it utilizes as a pretext
for derogating human rights. An even broader issue is that a government
may use states of emergency to entrench control over a population that
does not support its leaders. U.N. Special Rapporteur for States of Emer-
gency Despouy, in his final report and after reviewing twelve years of
practice on states of emergency, referred to "a growing tendency [by gov-
ernments] to invoke ethnic issues and/or internal disturbances caused by
social tensions due to economic factors linked to poverty, impoverishment
or the loss of social benefits by significant sectors of the population." 3 0 5
The extensive report of the recent Bahrain Independent Commission of
Inquiry also well demonstrates the nexus between longer-term social
problems, government repression, and the existence of a state of
emergency.306
C. Enlarging the Scope of States of Emergency
There is clearly a disconnect between the principles cited by interna-
tional treaty bodies in the relevant international cases, periodic reviews,
and general comments and those same bodies' actual practice in determin-
301. Comm'n on H.R., Summary Record of the 330th Meeting, 8th Sess., June 10, 1952,
at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.330 (July 1, 1952).
302. Svensson-McCarthy states that "the concept of public emergency cannot be in-
voked merely to defend the government in power at the price of muzzling political oppo-
nents." SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 240. Nowak refers to "dictatorships" that
"misuse the tool of emergencies to maintain their own positions of power." NOWAK, supra
note 38, at 84.
303. E.g., The Greek Case, App. Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 3344/67, 1969 Y.B. Eur.
Conv. on H.R. 1, 214 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Ermacora) (ob-
serving that there was a public emergency as defined by the ECHR, but that it seemed "in-
compatible" for the Greek government to have resort to Article 15 since it was the
government itself that was responsible for the situation).
304. Rep. of the H.R. Comm., supra note 133, 78.
305. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 36.
306. See generally BAHR. INDEP. COMM'N OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE BAHRAIN INDE-
PENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ch. 11 (2011), available at http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIre-
portEN.pdf (discussing the historical background).
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ing a state of emergency and assessing the proportionality of emergency
measures. Almost every complaint and case of the international treaty
bodies has implicitly accepted the government assertion of a state of emer-
gency. This cannot reflect reality. As Green comments, "a critical on-
looker would be justified in concluding that the chances of a state being
found guilty of wrongly declaring an emergency are somewhat remote."307
The fine distinctions in the law-for example, imminence versus potential-
ity, temporality versus normality-are not upheld in practice. The problem
is well summed up by Svensson-McCarthy, who notes that "[a]lthough the
notion of a public emergency might be defined in the abstract with relative
ease, the application in concreto of such definition gives rise to numerous
legal problems to which, so far, either only partial solutions have been
found, or none at all." 308
The judicial reluctance or indifference to assess de novo the state of
emergency, while retaining the formal legal authority to do so, has contrib-
uted to a dilution of the law's normativity.309 Each time a court or treaty
body only enters into an assessment on proportionality, even if it com-
ments very little on the state of emergency, it often implicitly concedes the
government's position and contributes to the enlargement of the scope of
what may be deemed a public emergency. As demonstrated above, this is
reflected in state practice and arguments. It leads to a body of jurispru-
dence under which probably a significant portion of the world's states at
any given time could plausibly, but unjustifiably, assert a state of emer-
gency-in relation to terrorist threats, for example-and derogate from
their human rights obligations. Moreover, this approach also opens itself
to deeper criticisms concerning the role of law in an emergency, which is
linked to the theoretical debates in Part I. As Dyzenhaus comments after
analysing the case law, "[t]he judicial record largely support's Schmitt's
claims, albeit not through the idea that the rule of law has no place in an
emergency, but through the idea that only a formal or wholly procedural
conception of the rule of law is appropriate for emergencies."310
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE LEGAL DOCTRINE
It is clear that the current state of the jurisprudence and practice is not
acceptable from the standpoint of a defensible articulation of international
treaty obligations and the protection of human rights. There is a need to
reduce the normative expansionism and abuse of states of emergency. As
discussed above, there are ideas for improving the implementation mecha-
nisms, but there is little immediate prospect of significant change in this
307. Green, supra note 33, at 100.
308. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 195.
309. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 197 (recognizing that the tendency of courts to
shrink from assessing government emergency is a key factor in the violations).
310. DYZENHAUS, supra note 12, at 35. The latter, according to Dyzenhaus, allow a
government "to have its cake and eat it too" and are "worse than grey holes," as they give
official lawlessness "the facade of legality," and in substance they are black holes. Id. at 42;
see also id. at 59.
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area. The majority of commentators state that the treaty bodies should
apply a more restrictive approach. They should be "critical," not "deferen-
tial," should adopt a "scrupulous judicial attitude," and should subject
state governments' claims to "rigorous analysis." 311 The calls for a stricter
approach overarch many commentators' proposals for progress and re-
form, including those such as clarifying the threshold of severity for an
emergency,312 eliminating the margin of appreciation,313 clarifying the
"temporal element" (that is, imminence), 314 and "developing phases"
within the emergency, each with differentiated measures,315 and so on.
However, where the existing norms are not being respected or imple-
mented in practice, the question arises what might be the effect of adopt-
ing additional norms of specificity. Fitzpatrick at least recognizes that this
higher standard setting for states of emergencies will reach a "threshold of
counterproductivity." 316 To strengthen and clarify the standards and inter-
national supervision is appealing in its simplicity, but it ignores the under-
lying factors that have driven the jurisprudence to its current parlous state.
Other commentators in IHRL scholarship try to develop broader theses.
For example, Svensson-McCarthy in her study argues that a state of emer-
gency must be guided by key principles, including the principle of legality
and the balance of the notions of national security and public order.3 17
These are the general principles that underpin the jurisprudence, but they
do little to resolve the current problems faced. There is a need for a new
and broader approach at the level of theory, legal doctrine, and politics
that has both prescriptive and descriptive value. The ICJ's study notes in
the context of improving implementation that "[t]his question must be ap-
proached with realism."3 18
311. E.g., McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 425 ("It was crucially important for the
[Human Rights Committee] to take a critical and restrictive approach to the implementation
of article 4 . .. in view of its very limited powers both under the reporting and individual
communications procedures, '[t]he most the implementation bodies can do is to adopt a
scrupulous judicial attitude that will influence world opinion by its objectivity and thorough-
ness."' (quoting Hartman, supra note 33, at 49)); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 263;
Joseph, supra note 163. There is support for the opposite view, that is, that the Court is best
placed to make the decisions on both the existence of an emergency and on the nature and
scope of the derogations, being detached from the turmoil and making decisions ex post
facto. See Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 45, at 639, 643.
312. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 224.
313. E.g., SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 319.
314. Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 252.
315. In terms of duration of a state of emergency, there is no specific case law, but one
commentator suggests that "if the intensity of the danger is of various developing phases or
degrees, the measures taken during each phase must vary accordingly." Aly Mokhtar,
Human Rights Obligations v. Derogations: Article 15 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 8 INT'L J. Hum. RTS. 65, 71 (2004).
316. FITZPATRICK, supra note 11, at 73.
317. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 93.
318. ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 439 (emphasis added). Grossman states that "it must
be acknowledged that because the problem is not solely juridical, neither is its solution."
Grossman, supra note 14, at 38.
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On review of the preceding Parts and analysis, this Article proposes
that the traditional substantive question of a public emergency should be
reconceived and subsumed into the procedural questions of declaration
and notification, both of which are clear requirements of Article 4. The
substantive assessment and threshold for a public emergency are not elimi-
nated, however, as they will always form an essential part of the propor-
tionality assessment of the emergency measures vis-A-vis the public
emergency. There are a number of reasons that this proposal is sound
from theoretical, legal, doctrinal, and political perspectives, each of which
are set out below.
The bifurcation of the two traditional legal questions is based on a
false assumption that the existence of a state of emergency is an objective
and stand-alone legal question. Instruments such as the Paris Minimum
Standards perpetuate this assumption: "The existence of a public emer-
gency which threatens the life of the nation, and which is officially pro-
claimed, will justify the declaration of the state of emergency." 319 In the
international human rights treaties, however, the concept of declaring a
state of emergency has no independent legal meaning or effect unless it is
accompanied by lawful measures of derogation. In other words, the point
of declaring a state of emergency is to justify lawful derogations from the
human rights treaties, and thus the real question is whether a particular
derogation is itself justified and thus lawful under the relevant treaty. It
therefore may not mean anything to have a lawful state of emergency if
the measures are unlawful, and there cannot be an unlawful declaration of
a state of emergency in a situation where in substance there is no deroga-
tion of human rights obligations. It is also difficult to conceive of an objec-
tive and stand-alone threshold (that is, for public emergency) that would
justify derogation and could exist entirely independent of any reference to
the emergency measures themselves. The emergency measures provide the
necessary context to the existence and justification for the state of emer-
gency. Furthermore, the borderline between exception and normality is
far more complex than suggested by the general and abstract principles
articulated by the treaty bodies. While the European jurisprudence tried
to develop general standards on a public emergency in the Greek Case,
these have been honored in the breach. As the analysis of General Com-
ment 29 demonstrated above, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has
largely steered clear of articulating any comparable and useful standards.
U.N. Special Rapporteur Despouy, who studied such situations closely for
many years and engaged in extensive dialogue with states, noted that the
arguments provided by governments for their respective emergencies were
"highly dissimilar." 32 0 The idea of some kind of concrete abstract thresh-
old for establishing a state of emergency is alluring but ultimately
misleading.
319. PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 11, 1 1(a) (emphasis added).
320. Special Rapportuer's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 36.
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It has to be acknowledged also that the subject matter of a threat to
the life of a nation is highly politically charged. As suggested by Schmitt
and others, such an assessment can be seen as a value judgment that goes
to the very heart of a state's decision-making autonomy and sovereignty.
In promoting the margin of appreciation in the Lawless case, Sir
Humphrey Waldock emphasized the "context of the rather special subject-
matter with which it deals: the responsibilities of a Government for main-
taining law and order in a time of war or any other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation." 321 This subject matter has been without
doubt difficult for the treaty bodies. Assessment of factual questions as to
whether there are emergency conditions that threaten the life of the nation
is difficult for international and transnational human rights courts and law-
yers. Such issues, for example in the context of war powers and foreign
policy, are not typically highly judicialized in most states' national legal
systems and also stretch the fact-finding capacities of treaty bodies. It is a
reality that governments will have access to entirely different sources of
information, including some that are arguably unsuitable for judicial con-
sideration such as classified intelligence information.
While not often mentioned expressly, the concept of separation of
powers has a role to play in states of emergency under IHRL. The margin
of appreciation, for example, is partly geared toward promoting this sepa-
ration of powers and avoiding damaging confrontations between the Court
and states party to the Convention. It is difficult for judicial or legal re-
view, at least within current IHRL architecture, to make and implement
determinations that distinguish between real and fictitious states of emer-
gency. As one author put it, the state of emergency or exception consti-
tutes a "point of imbalance between public law and political fact." 322 As
much as this author would prefer not to acknowledge the point, the cur-
rent situation demonstrates a mismatch of law and politics and of principle
and reality, a mismatch that undermines the law's normativity and promo-
tion of human rights. This is reflected in the stronger implementation con-
text of national laws, where the executives and legislatures are usually
given the power to declare a state of emergency and judicial review usually
pertains to the emergency measures rather than the assessment of the pub-
lic emergency. 323 To the extent that the IHRL mechanisms appropriate
the right to determine a public emergency, this does not actually replicate
the typical allocation of powers at the national level. This is well demon-
321. Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 45, at 632 (quoting Sir Humphrey Waldock).
322. E.g., Higgins, supra note 33, at 299 ("There is a constant counterpoising of two
elements, and the balance is not easy. On the one hand, the Commission must not, in the
exercise of its functions under Article 15, set itself up as a super-State; on the other hand, it
does not suffice that a State acted reasonably in finding that a public emergency exists. The
emergency must exist in fact.").
323. The work of the U.N. Special Rapporteur for States of Emergency found that it is
often the legislature that declares the emergency, the executive that carries it out, and judici-
ary that is able to decide the legality of the measures. Only in some countries is the judiciary
empowered to review the state of emergency. See Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra
note 1, 11 145, 148.
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strated by the A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
decision of the House of Lords, in which Lord Bingham for the majority
wrote on the question of the existence of a state of emergency:
It is perhaps preferable to approach this question as one of de-
marcation of functions or . . . "relative institutional competence".
The more purely political (in a broad or narrow sense) a question
is, the more appropriate it will be for political resolution and the
less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial decision. ...
It is the function of the political and not judicial bodies to resolve
political questions. Conversely, the greater the legal content of any
issue, the greater the potential role of the court, because under
our constitution and subject to the sovereign power of Parliament
it is the function of the courts and not of political bodies to resolve
legal questions. The present question seems to me to be very
much at the political end of the spectrum.324
It is notable that the European Court's Grand Chamber refused to
recognize this position-essentially the political-question doctrine-or to
endorse the House of Lords' reasoning.325 The European Court associated
(incorrectly) the House of Lords' decision with the margin of appreciation
under which the judiciary retains the authority to legally determine the
public emergency. With respect to the A & Others case, although some
commentators sought a more stringent burden on the British government
to provide "clear and convincing evidence" of the need for derogation, few
questioned the basic principle articulated by the House of Lords of a divi-
sion of legal responsibility based on separation of powers. 326
The interaction and conflict of governments and treaty bodies is not
dissimilar to the constitutionalist dynamic and its constant dialogue of law
and power, and of authority and legitimacy. 327 This general dynamic is
both relevant to, and perhaps more pronounced for, states of emergency
under international human rights law. As the ICJ's study recognizes, there
is a need to evaluate states of emergency with the limitations of interna-
tional law in mind, including recognition of the lack of adjudicative juris-
324. A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C.
68, 29 (appeal taken from Eng.) (emphasis added) (citing Lord Hoffman in Sec'y of State
for the Home Dep't v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153, 62). Lord Bingham
also said: "I would accept that great weight should be given to the judgment of the Home
Secretary, his colleagues and Parliament on this question, because they were called on to
exercise a pre-eminently political judgment." Id. 1 29.
325. A discussion of this doctrine is a large subject, both in cases and commentary, and
is beyond the scope of this present Article.
326. See Hickman, supra note 12, at 622-66; Humphreys, supra note 13, at 685.
327. This is a very large subject beyond the scope of this Article, but in the U.S. consti-
tutional law context, it is discussed in writings such as ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1997); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION (2nd ed., 1972); ALPHEUS T. MASON & DONALD G. STEPHENSON, JR.,
AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed., 1987); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
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diction, enforcement mechanisms, and resources. 328 This constitutional-
type dialogue takes place against the risk that states will withdraw their
effective support from the system. 329 States are also able to leverage a
narrative that international lawyers and human rights experts in distant
lands try to overrule a government's assessment of whether there is an
emergency in their country in order to compel treaty bodies to accept their
assessments of internal emergency situations. There is no shortage of
states under scrutiny that would wish to discredit and undermine the U.N.
Human Rights Committee and its views on human rights in their state.
As indicated above, by insisting on the substantive legal determination
of a public emergency, the treaty bodies have inadvertently enlarged the
permissible scope of the exception. One way to deal with this is to remove
the public-emergency determination from the sphere of legal review. This
is an unfortunate but necessary concession addressing a dichotomy of
scope and normativity at the very heart of states of emergency. This di-
chotomy is illustrated by Aileen McHarg's comment in the context of der-
ogations and balancing human rights and national security that "[m]ore
pragmatically, courts have to choose between giving strong protection to
rights, but with a relatively narrow jurisdiction to hear disputes, or alterna-
tively, a more extensive jurisdiction, but one where rights have to give way
in persistent conflicts with public interest goals." 330 The latter could be an
apt description of the margin of appreciation and states of emergency. The
"extensive jurisdiction" choice can be dangerous, as demonstrated in the
European system's desire to defer but ultimately retain the legal review of
the public emergency. It is better for courts and treaty bodies to avoid this
slippery slope, as the House of Lords did in the A & Others v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department case, by identifying the public-emergency
question as a political one, therefore providing for a clearer separation of
powers.
The suggestion that there is no separate legal determination of the
existence of a state of emergency should not be taken to indicate that the
substantive threshold of public emergency is no longer relevant. This is a
very important point. Rather, this threshold is incorporated and protected
in the assessment of the emergency measures through the prisms of notifi-
cation and proportionality. The national declaration and international no-
328. ICJ STUDY, supra note 38, at 439.
329. See Higgins, supra note 33, at 315.
One is also aware of the fact that, beyond the real difficulties ... in making judg-
ments on certain issues (difficulties that are probably more real in the national
security area than under normal 'ordre public' clauses), the [treaty body] is ex-
posed to the power of member States to renew or not to renew their recognition of
[its] competence ....
Id. at 313.
330. McHarg, supra note 41, at 683. As Humphreys also points out, a key criticism is
that "[a]ttempts to impose legal controls will merely infect ordinary rights protections with
extraordinary elasticity." Humphreys, supra note 13, at 679.
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tification of a public emergency is still a procedural requirement to be
satisfied under the relevant treaties. As identified above, many juridical
determinations of proportionality of measures include an assessment, ex-
press or implied, of the nature of the public emergency. Despite the ques-
tionable ability to actually define by legal means the difference between
"normality" and "exception," there is logic to the concept of a threshold
and differentiation. Norm and exception are difficult principles that will
always be hard to assess in the absence of the concrete measures. In prac-
tice, this Article's proposal would lead to an implied and contextual defini-
tion of a public emergency. A state of emergency would be a situation in
which measures of derogation in accordance with the human rights treaty
may be justified by that situation. For example, where the treaty body de-
termined that derogations were lawful, there obviously would be a public
emergency. Where it ruled that all of the state's purported derogations
were unlawful, the treaty body might provide guidance as to whether the
measures could be made lawful and in doing so would implicitly indicate
that the situation had reached the level of a public emergency. In essence,
this means conceding the (losing) battle of whether or not a public emer-
gency exists and focusing on ensuring that the measures taken to combat
the threat are proportionate to any emergency.
This new approach is more defensible and may help to reverse the
creeping normative expansion of what justifies a state of emergency. It
would help break the cycle of judicial deference in relation to public-emer-
gency questions-or rather the deference to government assertions-
which has also led to dilution of the proportionality assessment (for exam-
ple, as evidenced by the European Court applying a wide margin to both
legal questions). Proportionality will also provide better "legal cover" to
the judicial function from which to dissect the dubious but highly politi-
cally charged assertions of governments. The importance and appeal of
this methodology is recognized by McHarg: "As the very stuff of politics,
such decisions are bound to be hotly contested. Accordingly, judges need
to find a method for resolving conflicts between rights and the public in-
terest which is conceptually defensible and hence allows them to preserve
their claim to neutrality." 3 31 It becomes easier for judges and treaty body
members to deal with the lack of information and unclear burdens of
proof if there is no stand-alone legal determination of the emergency situ-
ation, as rather it is incorporated within the proportionality assessment.
The pressure on courts to reach precise and factually founded legal deter-
minations whether or not there is a public emergency will simply no longer
exist. In reality, as well demonstrated in many of the cases and situations
discussed above, treaty bodies have strongly avoided the determination of
public emergency anyway but are quite willing to find measures dispropor-
tionate. 332 It is probably the case that many findings of emergency mea-
331. McHarg, supra note 41, at 672 (emphasis omitted).
332. It should also be noted that, in the case of individual complaints, the proportional-
ity of the measures in toto may be assessed, rather than just how they applied to the individ-
ual. This approach was spelled out and endorsed by the European Court in A & Others. A &
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sures that are disproportionate are also underpinned by unstated concerns
about the public emergency. This might also change the incentives for
states to provide better information at the international level on the na-
ture of the public emergency.
Other commentators have not previously suggested redefining the bi-
furcation of the legal question as proposed in this Article. Yet there are
signs, in trying to grapple with the issues, that others have taken steps
down this pathway. The 1990 Copenhagen Document on Human Rights,
the product of an interstate process, restated basic principles of IHRL in-
cluding detailed standards on states of emergency.333 The Copenhagen
Document provided a description of states of emergency and derogations
that included a procedural but not substantive assessment of the state of
emergency. 334 The Paris Minimum Standards, prepared by a group of
scholars, provided in significant detail the power and jurisdiction of the
judicial function but did not provide within this framework for any assess-
ment of the existence of the state of emergency. 335 This Article's "implied
and contextual definition" approach, in which the state of emergency is
effectively defined in relation to the proportionality assessment, has also
been taken up implicitly by the U.N. Special Rapporteur Despouy:
[T]he competent authority may declare a state of emergency ...
[iun the event of severe disturbances that endanger the vital inter-
ests of the population and constitute a threat to the organized life
of the community, in the face of which the restrictive measures
permitted by the Constitution and laws in ordinary circumstances
are clearly inadequate . . . . 36
In the context of the cases and specific situations, many courts and
treaty bodies' majority judgments or views have skirted the legal determi-
nation of the existence of a public emergency, and the dissenting opinions
have taken issue with the government assertions. The House of Lords
judgment in A & Others is consistent with this approach. The most striking
recent example supportive of this Article's thesis is the highly substantive,
detailed, and focused review by the Bahrain Independent Commission on
Inquiry of Bahrain's unrest and state of emergency from March to April
2011. The Commission's otherwise very thorough 513-page report essen-
tially avoids analyzing the legal question of the public emergency and re-
Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, 175-181, 185 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91403.
333. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenha-
gen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE 1 25.1-.4 (1990), avail-
able at http://www.osce.org/odihr/19394.
334. Id. 1 25.1, 25.3.
335. See PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 11, 91 7.
336. Special Rapporteur's Tenth Report, supra note 1, 1 82 (emphasis added).
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markably did not even provide or analyze the text of Bahrain's derogation
under the Covenant.337
This Article's proposed reconceptualization of the legal doctrine could
help to reverse the trend of enlarging the scope of states of emergency. It
would do so by minimizing the number of cases in which there is accept-
ance, implicit or express, of states' broad or specious assertions of a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation. Unlike some of the other
suggestions in the literature, it need not cause major implementation
problems for courts, treaty bodies, or states. As discussed above, the sub-
stantive determination of a public emergency cannot have a stand-alone
legal effect or consequence in isolation of the emergency measures. The
qualitative change in the legal determinations would be that the public
emergency must be seen in the context and through the prism of the pro-
portionality of the measures.
The general effect of this reconceptualization is well illustrated by ref-
erence to the A & Others decision of the European Court. That case cur-
rently stands for the idea that there was a state of emergency and so
derogations in principle were permitted, but that the actual measures
adopted were not proportionate. The British government, after losing in
the House of Lords, had legislated to remove the offending measures from
its emergency-powers regime.338 The British government found a way to
deal with the issue without invoking Article 15 of the Convention at all.
Under the proposed approach in this Article, the ratio decidendi of the
European Court decision in A & Others would be different; most impor-
tantly, it would not have been legally affirmed that there was a state of
emergency that was fully justified by the circumstance of a nascent terror-
ist threat. This was because there was no legal justification under Article
15 for the measures taken in response to the state of emergency that the
United Kingdom had declared. This Article's proposed approach would
thus also support the general logic that "if possible, states should limit
rights rather than derogate from them." 339 A number of countries have
not derogated in arguable instances of states of emergency on the basis
that limitations, rather than derogations, gave them sufficient scope to
deal with the situation. 340
337. BAHR. INDEP. COMM'N OF INQUIRY, supra note 306, 105. Other than recanting
Article 4, the report's main substantive reference is to state that the violations of the rights of
arbitrary detention go beyond what could ever be derogated. Id.
338. Sangeeta Shah, From Westminster to Strasbourg: A and Others v United Kingdom,
9 Hum. RTs. L. REV. 473, 476 (2009).
339. McGoldrick, supra note 33, at 384.
340. See, e.g., H.R. Comm, Rep. of the H.R. Comm., 66th Sess., July 12-30, 1999, 324,
U.N. Doc. A/54/40; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1999); H.R. Comm., Rep. of the H.R.
Comm., 42nd Sess., July 8-26, 1991, 9$ 618-656, U.N. Doc. A/46/40; GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40 (1991); H.R. Comm., Rep. of the H.R. Comm., 10th Sess., July 14-Aug. 11,
1980, 297, U.N. Doc A/35/40; GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1980); H.R. Comm, supra
note 133, 383.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has offered an enriched account and reinterpretation of
the international human rights law on states of emergency and the deroga-
tion of human rights. The need for this account is driven by the serious
human rights violations often connected with states of emergency, the sig-
nificant gap between human rights law and practice, and inconsistent and
divergent jurisprudence. A key problem for courts and treaty bodies is
that they continue to affirm, either directly or indirectly, unfounded gov-
ernment assertions of a state of emergency, thereby diluting the law's
normativity and its positive influence. The analysis of the underlying the-
ory of states of emergency, coupled with the practical limits of implemen-
tation under IHRL, provides the context and foundation for a new
approach. This Article's more holistic analysis brings to light key themes
that act as undercurrents to the treaty law-the legal dichotomy of nor-
mality and exception, the role of separation of powers, the rule of law as
compared to extralegal measures, democracy as a check on emergency
powers, emergencies based on continued terrorist threats, and government
causation of emergencies. These key legal themes illustrate that there
needs to be a middle course for IHRL that better balances the legitimate
position of sovereign states to defend their constitutional order with
preventing misuse and abuse of emergency powers. 341
This Article argues the most effective solution is to understand that
the traditional substantive question of the existence of a public emergency
should be reconceived and subsumed into the procedural question of dec-
laration and notification. There is no need for an artificial stand-alone le-
gal determination of whether or not there is a public emergency. With this
reinterpretation, the substantive concept of a public-emergency precondi-
tion and threshold is still preserved, as the proportionality-of-measures as-
sessment will always include the nature and scope of the public
emergency. This leads in effect to an implied and contextual definition for
public emergency and one that avoids the constant legal reification of
states' dubious claims. Finally, this reconceptualization of the legal doc-
trine for state of emergencies in IHRL, which can be reconciled with both
theory and practice, is one important opportunity for tackling the serious
problem of human rights abuses in times of emergency.
341. See NOWAK, supra note 38, at 85.
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